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Akashi Says Japan 'Must Contribute' Troops

AU0301160694 Paris AFP in English 1551 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] Zagreb, Jan 3 (AFP)—Yasushi Akashi, the United Nations' new special representative in ex-Yugoslavia, said upon his arrival here Monday that Japan must contribute peacekeeping troops toward the conflict in the region. "Japan, which is now a major power, has to cooperate with European countries, with the United States, Canada and the other governments which are already deeply involved in restoring peace here in ex-Yugoslavia," Akashi said during a press conference.

"If Europeans are in Asia, why shouldn't Asians be in Europe," he said refering to UN peacekeeping troops deployed in Cambodia.

Akashi, 62, in his new assignment becomes the special UN representative in the former Yugoslavia and head of the UN Protection Force deployed in the region. He replaces Thorvald Stoltenberg who will retain his position as co-chairman of the Geneva peace talks on the Bosnian conflict. Akashi previously headed the UN force deployed in Cambodia.

Akashi later announced that a team of Japanese Government experts would soon arrive in former Yugoslavia to study how Tokyo could "extend its cooperation in order to help restore peace" to the region. He also said he was planning to reorganize some sections of UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces], introducing elements which he had personally selected. He said he saw his role as helping to reestablish confidence between the three warring factions.

Rumors of Top-Level SDS-BSP Talks Examined

AU0401094794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 Dec 93 p 6

[Ivan G. Ivanov commentary: "Opposite Poles Attract One Another"]

[Text] At one time there was a popular joke to the effect that "every rumor is a reality!" It has turned out that this witticism still has topical significance.

The persistent rumor of a meeting between the top leaders of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] and BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is on the way to being confirmed. Filip Dimitrov, SDS National Coordinating Council leader, has declared that he has met with [BSP leader] Zhan Videnov.

The leaders of the two main political forces indeed have plenty to talk about. The subjects for discussion go far beyond seeking a way out from the vexatious situation in which the SDS and BSP have found themselves and possibly forming a coalition to fight local elections.

Both the SDS and the BSP have their reservations regarding Dr. Zhelev, and they did not permit him to extend his powers.

The same applies to any early National Assembly elections. A well-calculated amendment to the Electoral Law would enable the SDS's "disloyal ally," the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms], to be thrown overboard and ensure the tranquil existence of a two-party parliament in the future.

Another question is that neither the SDS nor the BSP really want elections before the end of parliament's allotted term. This is also a subject for discussion.

Regarding the naive voters (if there are any left) for whom the idea of such a meeting appears ridiculous, let them recall one of the laws of physics, which states that opposite poles attract one another.

DPS Municipality Plan 'Threat' to Sovereignty

AU0401115394 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 Dec 93 p 6

[Article by Dimitur Vasilev: "Movement for Rights and Freedoms Is Preparing To Form an Association of Municipalities To Act as a State Within the State"]

[Text] At the end of November the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] held its second national conference, which adopted the DPS program and decisions on its future activities. In fulfillment of the latter, in December the DPS initiated meetings in certain municipalities to discuss and adopt a "Charter for an Association of Municipalities." DPS municipal councillors had taken the trouble to draft a document called a charter for establishing a new administrative-state organization not prescribed under national legislation. At this point it must be stated that the association dreamt up by the DPS is illegitimate. The National Assembly is the only body with the powers to constitute and create new state bodies not covered by the Constitution and the law of the land.

The aims and tasks of the association as recorded in its charter emphasize its supramunicipal character. It is to be an body of government that can impose a dictate over its member municipalities in deciding specific issues, albeit with the "consent" of the mayor of the municipality in question. It is no accident that the charter includes this phrase—with the consent of the mayor, because the purpose of this is to make it easier for the association to impose its dictate in practice, for the mayors exercise the power of the state, not only representing the municipalities, but also governing them. On the other hand, not every mayor in the territory covered by the association can be a DPS member. For this reason, the association's leadership will not be able to wield its dictate in every municipality. Furthermore, all the DPS mayors are functionaries of the local DPS leaderships and are subject to their will. They are obliged to fulfill the DPS program. Evidently, the association's leadership will consist solely of DPS representatives. In the last elections, 27 municipal mayors, 653 village mayors, and 24 National Assembly deputies were elected from the DPS list. According to the decisions of the DPS national conference, they are all DPS functionaries and must obey its orders.

Under the charter, the association's member municipalities can preserve their economic, political, and juridical independence, but how will they retain it when, according to the same charter, the association may set them tasks, supervise them, adopt decisions to be carried out by the municipalities, and call them to account. Although they have joined the association "voluntarily," the municipalities are placed under its leadership. Accordingly, the association becomes an body of the DPS and is anticonstitutional in nature. It will comprise not one, but several associations, established on administrative-territorial and ethnic principles. Accordingly, the associations form an intermediate link in the state structure. They are tending to replace the regional and district municipal councils as specified in the Local Self-Government Act that have not been created so far and are unlikely to appear in the future. The DPS has decided to fill this gap by forming these associations. They are being created in regions with a Turkish- speaking population and are differentiated on an ethnic basis. The Constitution does not permit such autonomous territorial formations (under Article 2, Paragraph 1).

According to the charter, the leadership of the association consists of one representative for each municipality—its mayor, who has only one vote in the adoption of decisions, which are passed by an absolute majority, that is, by half the number of members present plus one. The charter does not state the number of members in the association's collective leadership, its minimum or maximum membership, or where its headquarters will be

located, nor does it in any way resolve the not unimportant issue of how the association will be financed.

The charter, despite its legal imperfections, is of great political importance because of the ethnic aims that it pursues. For this reason, prominence must be given to the ethnic goals that the DPS aims to achieve through the association. The DPS is trying to use it as a form of intermunicipal unification so as to provide qualified assistance to the DPS mayors in their administrative work. Accordingly, it may help them to stick more closely together, exercise more effective control over them, and help to resolve more efficiently the problems addressed in the DPS program.

The DPS wants to create an independent administrative and territorial unit that is protected from external influence. Here one can perceive the idea that Ahmed Dogan put forward at the DPS national conference, namely that no one should be able to exercise his dictate in the territory covered by the association—not parliament, the president, the government, or anyone else. In this way, the DPS provides itself with a terrain for acting and holding sway, undisturbed by anyone, over the territory of the sovereign Bulgarian state, and for manipulating and deciding everything that arises from its program. This is already a basis for ethnic differentiation and for developing political, cultural, and economic autonomy. Thus, the association becomes "a state within the state," in complete contravention of the Constitution and the laws. By creating the association on this basis, the DPS can direct it and link it more closely with our southern neighbor, which in recent years has been displaying and following a purposeful and well- planned policy in many ways in the regions of Bulgaria with a Turkish-speaking population. This already represents a threat to the national security and sovereignty of the state of Bulgaria.

Commentary Criticizes Expulsion of Zhirinovskiy

AU0401094994 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 Dec 93 p 6

[Unattributed commentary: "Unnecessary and Stupid"]

[Text] The interior minister's order to expel Zhirinovskiy is unnecessary and stupid and leaves open the question of who were the real people behind it. It also indicates a loss of nerve.

It is unnecessary because Zhirinovskiy was leaving anyway within the 24-hour deadline. So why did they not expel him when he arrived on Sunday?

It is stupid because, as was proved way back in the days of totalitarianism, it is in principle foolish to react to words with persecution.

It is clear that Zhirinovskiy went too far with his call for the replacement of the Bulgarian president. It is also clear that the press reacted sharply. However, no newspaper (except one privatized trade union paper) and no institution demanded the expulsion of this party leader, who won the largest number of votes in the Russian elections.

In contrast to the interior minister, the press reacted neither to the first tipoff nor to anyone's suggestion.

If it is necessary to expel everyone who permits himself to make insulting statements about the president, then Minister Mikhaylov should expel (to where?) Edvin Sugarev and all those who burned portraits and books of Zhelev during Sugarev's hunger strike.

Furthermore, why was [U.S. Ambassador] Montgomery not declared a persona non grata? In the final analysis, the Russian declared his dislike of a single figure, whereas the American criticized the Bulgarian Constitution.

One should either combat Zhirinovskiy's statement by the force of argument or swallow what he said, as the president did in the case of Montgomery. Surely both cases constitute interference in the country's internal affairs?

When nervous reactions of condemnation invade politics, we are no longer talking of politics, but of a wrestling mat, which is very sad when one remembers that Bulgaria is no longer a world force in wrestling.

Company Invites Bids To Modernize Kozloduy

AU0301154894 Paris AFP in English 1505 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] Sofia, Jan 3 (AFP)—The Bulgarian electricity company launched an invitation for tenders to modernise four 440 megawatt nuclear units at the Kozloduy power station on Monday. The programme is to be financed by the nuclear safety fund of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the tenders are to be opened on March 4 in the presence of bidders.

The first stage of improvements to make safe the four obsolete units of Soviet design was completed last week when the the oldest unit, which had been in service since 1974, was put back into operation. This unit had been closed in September 1991 on the recommendation of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Apart from the four units of 440 megawatts, the plant comprises two more modern units, each of 1,000 megawatts. The power station provides between 30 percent and 40 percent of energy used in Bulgaria.

Minister Discusses Privatization Process

AU0301200194 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 30 Dec 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Jiri Skalicky, minister for the administration and privatization of national property, by Olga Skalkova; place and date not given: "Most of the Property Will be Privatized Before the End of This Electoral Term"]

[Excerpts] [Skalkova] In the near future, the definitive list of the enterprises offered in the second and the last wave of coupon privatization will be published, and this will close an important stage in the transformation of the economy. How much state property has been privatized so far, how much is left to be privatized, and what is the share of the private sector in the generation of the gross national product?

[Skalicky] These questions are very difficult to answer in precise figures. The problem is that we neither know the exact value of the property that remains in the hands of the state, nor do we have precise numbers on the property already transferred to private hands in the framework of restitutions. We only know that more than 100,000 real estate properties have been returned, for instance, in the framework of the small-scale restitution on the level of enterprise-authorized persons. Another property transfer took place by means of the so-called small-scale privatization that is to end with this year. It was an insignificant amount from the point of view of the entire process of denationalization—the book value lies somewhere between 20 and 25 billion korunas, the yield is approximately 33 billion korunas.

Practically all the property that had been registered in time was included in the large-scale privatization. The book value of the property that entered the two privatization waves totalled about 1.2 to 1.3 billion korunas. Some of the enterprises on the list ended in bankruptcy and liquidation even before the privatization projects were submitted and assessed.

The value of the property being privatized is lower by this amount. We do not precisely know the book value of the property that, as decided, will not be privatized for five years, and the same applies to the property that is to remain in public or state ownership. [passage omitted]

Much more important than the value of the property in the state or private hands is, however, the data on the development of the share of the private sector in the generation national product. It has already reached 57 percent, which indicates even more favorable development than corresponds to the real pace of privatization. Namely, private firms not only emerge from privatization but also on "green sites."

[Skalkova] Can you at least give the ratio between the state property privatized for remuneration and the share of property for which the state does not collect any financial means?

[Skalicky] The property transferred free of charge in the form of the coupon privatization is estimated at 400 to 450 billion korunas. Another significant share of the property—about 60 to 100 billion korunas—was transferred to communities in the form of shares of certain enterprises that represent environmentally, for instance, a burden on the region or are of key importance for its infrastructure.

The value of property that has been sold directly or in the form of shares to domestic or foreign investors—or the sale of which has been decided—amounts to only 200 to 250 billion korunas. That is a surprisingly low amount if we compare it with the value of the property transferred free of charge. [passage omitted]

[Skalkova] How do you foresee the development in investment funds?

[Skalicky] They will go basically in two directions. A part of the funds will tend to the role of the traditional institutional investor, i.e. stabilize its average proceeds by a broad portfolio. These funds will not have any ambitions of an influential owner. The other part of the funds—and I put my hope with respect to the influence exertion on the enterprises in these funds—will limit the diversity of the portfolio to a special sector or a group of enterprises. Therefore, in the future, we will have to consider the abolition of the 20 percent limit to the capital participation of these funds in stockholding companies. [passage omitted]

[Skalkova] Lately, the share of foreign investments seems to be ceding to the portfolio investments, but this type of capital does not bring any know-how or new technology, which the enterprises need to be competitive. What, in your opinion, is the contribution of such privatization?

[Skalicky] I would not underestimate this type of privatization, because the foreign investor must have decided for it in order to influence the enterprise. The only thing is that this form is less obvious and—similarly to investments in enterprises made prior or after the privatization—manifests itself only gradually. I actually consider this trend desirable because now, when the conditions for normal development of the economy have been created, we definitely need foreign capital. One of the greatest current problems are the excessively expensive credits. The portfolio investments, however, are not a part of the privatization process but rather—and I insist—a beneficial result of the gradual privatization. They certainly would not enter anonymous state enterprises in the same scope. [passage omitted]

[Skalkova] What will the privatization process be like after the second wave of privatization is completed?

[Skalicky] I would characterize this period by saying that it will be the post-privatization cleanup. We want the founding sectors to now submit a list of property for additional small privatization waves. We are going to collaborate on a similar task with the district offices.

There is also some state property established by the communities. We intend to involve the district privatization commissions in the search for the unattached property. There will not be much, but some will certainly be found. [passage omitted]

There is a relatively broad scale of methods at our disposal, so the privatization process can reach its end as quickly as possible. It should happen before the end of this electoral term.

ΩEuropean Social Democrats Plan Strategy

94P20171A

[Editorial Report] The emergence of right-wing nationalism in the recent Russian elections was the main concern expressed by Milos Zeman, head of the Czech Social Democratic Party, in an interview published after a recent conference of social democratic parties. Zeman, in his 20 December interview in the right-of-center Prague daily CESKY DENIK, said that the social-democratic parties of Central Europe must develop a strategy to counter the danger presented by the emergence of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy to political power in Russia because "Mr. Zhirinovskiy belongs to the extreme Right, the extreme Right is extremely nationalistic, and this nationalism, combined with expansionist ambitions, presents a clear threat to the region of Central Europe." The conference, which took place in Bratislava on 18-19 December, was the first meeting of the seven social democratic parties of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

Asked by CESKY DENIK reporter Petruska Sustrova whether it did not bother him that "at least two of your partners are parties directly descended from communist parties," Zeman said he had to respect the results of elections and pointed out that the parties in question enjoyed rather high voter support. In fact, he said, "One of them, in Poland, was so high that it won the elections."

Zeman said that the Bratislava meeting was also attended by representatives of the German, Swedish, and Austrian social democratic parties, and that the formulation of strategy by the Central European parties "must naturally be conducted in close coordination with the West European social democrats."

Voicing the hope that the social democrats would win the coming West German elections, Zeman revealed that "we are holding a two-day get-together with SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Chairman [Rudolf] Sharping in March." He expressed the hope that cooperation among the region's social democrats "could lead to a social democratic Central Europe in a few years." As an example of socialist resurgence, Zeman noted that the Hungarian Socialist Party has taken the lead in the latest public opinion polls, with elections scheduled for next May.

Hungarians Refuse To Postpone Komarno Meeting

LD0301203694 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] Mikulas Duray and Stefan Pasztor, representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, continue to refuse to postpone the Komarno 8 January meeting of deputies and mayors who are to debate the possibility of setting up in southern Slovakia a region with a special legal status.

There is no reason to change anything, Komarno Mayor Stefan Pasztor said in an interview with CTK. Problems remain and we need a joint stance of a large number of people. At the same time he assured that the meeting will be held in accordance with the law on petitions.

Matica Slovenska [Slovak cultural institution] officials yesterday appealed for the meeting in Komarno to be cancelled. In their opinion, the meeting endangers the territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic. They also demanded that a law on the protection of the republic be adopted.

Mikulas Duray reckons that it will be not possible to push through the demands of the Hungarian minority under the present government. However, he considers a Hungarian self-governing region, where minority Slovaks would enjoy the same status as do the Hungarians within the Slovak majority, on a reciprocal basis, to be a realistic long-term objective.

MKDH Leader Distances Himself From Coexistence

AU0301212794 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 29 Dec 93 p 1

[Interview with Vojtech Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, by Peter Toth; place and date not given: "We Do Not Want To Be 'Diluted'"]

[Text] [Toth] In the Tuesday (28 December 1993) issue of SLOVENSKY DENNIK, Arpad Matejka, government commissioner for the new territorial and administrative arrangement, said that it was impossible to grant collective rights to the Hungarian ethnic minority and to establish ethnic borders in Slovakia. How do you evaluate his statements?

[Bugar] Who is talking here about ethnic borders? Who wants to establish ethnic borders? Ethnic borders cannot be established in Slovakia, because southern Slovakia is ethnically mixed, inhabited by both Slovaks and Hungarians. What we want to prevent is a further artificial "dilution" of these areas, so that the districts of Dunajska Streda and Komarno are not "tagged" as purely Slovak districts. In this way, the higher territorial entities would be "diluted" in such a way that the Hungarian minority would everywhere constitute fewer than 20 percent of the population.

[Toth] There is no doubt that within the Hungarian minority there exists a minority that would welcome ethnic borders. Is the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] prepared to eliminate this factor?

[Bugar] If such people exist at all, they are only individuals. It is not a minority or a group, but only individuals who could imagine a different territorial and administrative division and, perhaps, also a completely different government and, maybe, also a different state. There will always be such individuals. What counts, however, is the political will of parliamentary parties. What count are the intentions of representatives of the Hungarian minority, be they politicians or representatives of Csemadok [Hungarian minority's cultural organization] or the Union of Hungarian Pedagogues in Slovakia. So far, I have not encountered anywhere the intention to secede from Slovakia or to create a purely Hungarian region.

[Toth] Coexistence Chairman Miklos Duray has said on several occasions, between the lines [medzi recou], that his aim was territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority. He is an individual, but a leader of your coalition partner....

[Bugar] If Mr. Duray understands as "territorial autonomy" the rights that, according to the new territorial and administrative division, will fall due to the other regions, regardless of whether these regions are Slovak or mixed, everything is okay. These are self-administered areas with certain powers. But if he understands by this term territorial autonomy such as exists in South Tyrol, it is a waste of time to speak about it because we know that the political will for this is lacking, both on the Slovak side and on the part of various European institutions (such as, for example, the Council of Europe). The draft principles of the law on the position of ethnic minorities, as signed by both the MKDH and Coexistence deputies, speaks about transferring jurisdiction over education and culture to the regions. If someone speaks about something else, it is only his personal view, even if it is Mr. Duray himself.

U.S. Contender Defeated in Bid for Private TV

AU0301160894 Bratislava SME in Slovak 29 Dec 93 p 2

["po"-attributed report: "The Slovak Television Council Proposed That the CTV Company Be Granted a License To Operate the Second Television Channel"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting decided in a secret ballot yesterday to propose that the CTV Ltd. Bratislava company be granted a license for the STV [Slovak Television] 2 channel. One of CTV's representatives is Marcel Dekanovsky, the Kosice movie director.

In the course of the preceding weeks, 12 contenders presented their concepts to obtain 12 hours of broadcasting time on STV 2. Slovak Television will continue to operate the channel during the remaining hours. The

commercial station will broadcast from 1700 to 0500 hours. Apart from the victorious CTV, whose nomination still must be approved by parliament, the license had also been sought by the following firms: Redstone, Davay, Sola, Sezam TV, SP, Artep, Markiza, Danube Television Channel, Medium 5, Sitno 5, and Cent Eur (behind which stands U.S. the capital of Turner BS, which owns, among other things, the Cable News Network).

In a secret ballot, CTV won five votes from members of the Council, Cent Eur won three votes, and Sitno 5 won one vote.

Government Approves Ambassador to United States

AU0301162694 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Dec 93 p 2

["rk"-attributed report: "Restrictions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs"]

[Text] Bratislava—SME approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Department in conjunction with reports in the daily press about a "list of some 100 Ministry of Foreign Affairs staffers who are to leave the Ministry in January being prepared" and about "the closure of several Slovak embassies abroad." We were told that no such list exists at the Ministry. In response to our question about how many foreign missions would be closed, and for what reasons, the press department stated that "in view of the volume of financial resources allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic from the state budget for 1994, the Ministry had to draw up a set of cost-cutting measures, within the framework of which it is considering the closure of some foreign missions as well as staff reductions at foreign missions." It promised "to inform the mass media once the proposed measures have been approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the government." As Minister Jozef Moravcik recently promised that the posts of ambassadors to the United States, Germany, and Hungary would be filled by the end of the year, we inquired about their appointment. We learned that "Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Moravcik submitted to a Slovak Government meeting proposals for the appointment of ambassadors to the three countries. So far, the government has approved Branislav Lichardus as ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States and the president of the republic has signed his nomination. He has received an agreement from the U.S. side and will take up his post shortly," the reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Department states in conclusion.

Horn's Policy on Minority in Slovakia Examined

AU0401093494 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 29 Dec 93 p 7

[Unattributed editorial: "The Prague Probe"]

[Text] It has now been revealed that Gyula Horn [chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP] is looking into the MSZP's strategy on neighborhood policy in terms of conciliation, the essence of which is that to restore confidence, the inviolability of borders and the necessity to respect national minority rights should both be included in future basic agreements. In fact, Horn is testing more than this when he tells a Prague newspaper that if the MSZP is given the opportunity to implement its foreign policy program, then it will strive to have basic agreements signed with these contents as soon as possible.

At the moment, there is no point to guessing whether the MSZP will get this opportunity. However, according to our information, it is almost certain that the MSZP's strategy is obvious for the enlightened section of the Hungarian party spectrum. Therefore it is likely that if a coalition with this kind of enlightened majority comes to power next year, their foreign policy will be dominated by a neighborhood strategy similar to that of the MSZP's. Therefore, the results of the Prague investigation could even assume national importance.

It appears to be particularly ingenious that Horn detailed the concept, which he published in Hungary about three weeks ago (and which received virtually no response here), in a Prague newspaper. Although the Czech Republic is not one of our neighbors, as a result of 70 years of shared history it is quite attuned to Hungarian sensitivity to Slovak foreign policy, while this "message from Budapest" may appear more credible if it comes to Bratislava through a Prague detour rather than in "direct transmission."

It will be interesting to find out how [Slovak Prime Minister] Meciar (or Romanian President Iliescu, or perhaps Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic) reacts to this offer of Horn's, which speaks about mutual offers rather than bargaining. He did not say "if you give me the border issue, then I will give you the national minority rights"—it was something completely different.

This something different is the lesson of European history—also being intended for domestic use. It shows that the problems of national minorities cannot be solved through reattaching territories. It also shows that only guaranteeing the borders, rather than changing them, can bring peace, however badly and unjustly they were established in the first place and, for this reason, the borders must to be made permeable and open. It shows that the members of a national minority must be free to meet their relatives over the border whenever they want and, on their return, books and newspapers in their language must not be confiscated by customs officers. It shows that these minorities must be allowed schools and choirs in their home country, and, living in one unit, they should be able to elect their leaders, have the same freedom as other citizens to start businesses, and, something that is not a reality but only a wish even in Western Europe: Owing to their predetermined disadvantage, they should enjoy a few more rights on certain issues than the others (positive discrimination).

Bosnia and the disease tormenting Yugoslavia are examples of the opposite. Does anyone yearn for these? Before anyone tries to use the trump card of the "sold minorities" in the election campaign, he should consider this. [sentence as published] If he can.

Parliament Decision on Minorities Criticized

AU0301184594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Dec 93 p 3

[Tibor Kis editorial: "Gift"]

[Text] By denying Hungary's national minorities the right to set independent election lists, parliament gave an unexpected Christmas surprise to [Cluj Mayor] Funar, [Slovak Prime Minister] Meciar, and the anti-Hungarian forces of the neighboring countries. As long as this decision is in force, parliament will not have a moral right to speak up against the violations of national minority rights in the neighborhood, because it has also joined the lines of those who violate these rights. After this, what can be said to the accusations that Hungarian legislation does not practice what it preaches? While in all Europe, it is probably this parliament that speaks most about national minority rights, it has not really done anything more to solve this tense problem of the region than the parliaments and governments it so often criticizes.

Naturally, there is an explanation to the ominous decision—discarding the "corporative element of representation"—however, this does not at all appears to be convincing when we consider what is at stake. The decision certainly goes against the national minorities; mainly because the parliamentary parties were obviously unable even to bear the thought of the very hypothetical possibility that the representatives of national minorities might decide the voting on a certain political issue. Narrow party political considerations decided a matter that should not have anything to do with party politics. If there is an all-national problem then it is the national minority issue; therefore, it is simply astounding how little the deputies were able to realize that progress cannot be made through superficial rhetoric, empty speech, and especially not through indiscriminately denouncing the neighboring national minority policies. Instead, it can mainly be done through example. Among other things, through Hungary generously and without hesitation granting all rights to its national minorities that can be given in Europe at the moment, and which it itself expects from others. This generosity would be simple in our case, because we have fewer citizens belonging to national minorities than the neighboring

countries have. If we cannot find acceptable solutions even in these circumstances, then what right do we have to expect the neighboring countries to deal with the national minority issues on their merit?

Of course, in the given case, international assessments are not the major problem. After all, we should settle our national minority problems for our own good rather than to give an example to others. These rights would be due to the national minorities in Hungary even if all Hungarians living beyond the border were deprived of them. The simple reason is that these people are Hungarian citizens, the constitutional provisions apply to them the same way as to others. And Hungary, after all, is a democratic constitutional state.

This fact of being a constitutional state appears to have been violated through parliament's antiminority decision. This in itself is enough shame. It would be even bigger shame if we cannot find a remedy to this wounding of Hungary's national minorities before the next elections.

Hungarian Way Leader on Political Unity Issue

LD0301190194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] The Hungarian Way Circles movement considers rapprochement with the coalition parties possible, Chairman Istvan Csurka has said, adding that relations between the movement and the government parties naturally depend also on the willingness of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the operation of the Boross government. Krisztina Hadas reports:

[Hadas] The statement of the Hungarian Way Circles presidium urges unity of national forces. According to movement leader Istvan Csurka, today countless parties characterize themselves as national but this self-declaration is no more than an empty phrase. The Hungarian Way Circles movement interprets such unity as meaning unity with parties of the present government coalition.

[Begin Csurka recording] This appeal, in fact, concerns the coalition parties and the smaller and bigger political gatherings and movements which are already members of the Hungarian Way. Now we wish to see more pronounced politics from them. After all, the force in government is the most important, regardless of how much of its popularity has been lost during the time of governing. [end recording]

[Hadas] At his news conference Csurka said that the four month activity of the government lead by Peter Boross could be extremely important for the country's future. The leader of the Hungarian Way Circles hopes that the forthcoming national conference of the Hungarian Democratic Forum will bring a favorable political turn for them. He did not speculate but said that, come what may, the Hungarian Way Circles and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party can only influence the government by declarations of principles.

Army Spokesman Sees Budget Difficulties Ahead

AU0301204594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Dec 93 p 4

[Correspondent's report: "The Army Will Not Have Money for Development in 1994"]

[Text] Compared to previous years, it will only be possible to maintain the Hungarian Army's ability to function through much greater sacrifices, Defense Ministry Spokesman Colonel Lajos Erdelyi told NEPSZABADSAG.

The Army's planned 66.5 billion-forint 1994 budget is only enough to maintain the current level but not to carry out serious development. Some 90 percent of this amount will be spent on daily operational expenses, Colonel Gyorgy Paszto, leader of the Defense Ministry's Defense Management Main Department, said after President Arpad Goncz signed the Defense Law on 23 December and, at the same time, the government had accepted the regulation on its implementation.

In connection with this, Lajos Erdely pointed out that in the 1994 budget it is envisaged that the Army would acquire 8 billion forints in income from the sale of stocks, army barracks, and similar buildings. It will be very difficult to achieve this, Erdelyi said. Although in 1994, in real terms, the Army will dipose of a sum which is more than 2-billion forints more than in 1993, financial problems are anticipated because of inflation and the tasks that will be new in 1994. Erdelyi found it especially worrying that the amount that can be spent on material and technical development has decreased to a minimum level. For 10 years, the Army has been unable to ensure the supposedly ideal 60 percent to 40 percent maintenance and development ratio. In 1994, less than 5 percent of the 66.5 billion forints will be left for development; the change of the Army uniforms is also included in this. The financial problems are made worse by the running costs of the 28 Russian MiG-29 aircraft that were included in the system at the end of the year, the planned launching of air force officer training in Szolnok, and the previous commitment to set up a Hungarian UN training base, Erdelyi said.

In 1994, U.S. military industrial enterprises will deliver 113 complete electronic Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) systems to the Hungarian air-force. As is known, Parliament earmarked 1.1 billion forints from the budget for this purpose in 1993. According to the plans, the specialists of the U.S. air-force will fit the equipment on 28 MiG-29, nine MiG-23, 65 MiG-21, and 11 Su-22 aircraft. The prototypes on the various types of aircraft have already been set up and tried out. In addition to this, the suppliers will also fit four Russian-type land-based location systems with "questioning equipment." Putting these in position will probably begin mid-1994.

According to the NAPI VILAGGAZDASAG, a deal that is part of a U.S. Government program will amount to some $12.7 billion.

Troops Reinforce Border With Serbia

LD3112104093 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 31 Dec 93

[Text] Border Guards have reinforced the protection of the Hungarian-Serbian border. They fear that due to the introduction of a travel tax in rump Yugoslavia that is to come into force soon, many people will try to come across to Hungary illegally. Border Guard Spikesman Attila Krisan said that as a result of the new decree, which is valid as of midnight, the number of Yugoslavs entering was down to a minimum at the Tompa, Roeszke, and Hercegszanto border crossing points.

Paks Nuclear Station Faces Storage Problems

AU0301181594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Dec 93 p 1

[Correspondent's report: "The Fate of the Paks Nuclear Power Station Is Uncertain"]

[Text] If we do not find a safe solution to store the expended fuel within 18 months then the further operation of the Paks Nuclear Power Station Inc. may become doubtful. Should this happen, half of Hungary's energy production would be lost, Laszlo Kemenes, leader of the company's information service, said.

In the past, the expended fuel was transported to the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1992, the Russian parliament accepted an environmental protection law that bans the import of dangerous waste. In spite of this, in February 1993, Russia accepted expended fuel filling a railway carriage. However, it is not at all certain that it will again do this, although it has not indicated, either, that it will refuse to process waste from Paks in the future. The Ukrainian side has already indicated that it would let the deliveries pass through. Considering the favorable atmosphere of talks with the Russians, it cannot be excluded that future deliveries will be possible. As Hungary cannot expose itself to the decisions of other countries, a solution will definitely have to be found within a short time.

For five years, the used-up fuel elements has been stored in a resting basin at the Paks Nuclear Power Station, then they were transported in special containers. At the moment, the free storage capacity at Paks is enough for 18 months, therefore, if no solution is found in the coming 18 months then, failing all else, the nuclear power station might be halted.

Being aware of this situation, to safely solve the further placement of waste, the company had internationally announced bids for building a transitional storage, and this was won by the French-British GEC-ALSTHOM. This company, which has built several of this type of storage, will have to complete the reception building and the storage area in 18 months. Although temporarily, the Paks Nuclear power station would gain time through this 3 to 3.5 billion forints investment.

National Bank Devalues Forint by 1 Percent

LD0101165194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 1 Jan 94

[Text] The forint will be devalued by 1 percent as of 3 January. The decision was made by the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] within its scope of authority. The MNB gave the strengthening of the U.S. dollar on international foreign exchange markets as the reason for the decision. A communique points out that the measure is in line with the MNB's official exchange rate policy.

Olechowski Discusses Talks With Kinkel

LD0401091394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0700 GMT 4 Jan 94

[Text] Next week NATO will openly reiterate the openness of the alliance to new members and the fact that no country has a right of veto on this issue, Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski said at Warsaw Okecie airport yesterday after his return from a one-day visit to Germany. His talks with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel were extended from the planned 15 minutes to one hour. They concerned primarily the NATO summit, which will be held in Brussels on 10 January.

[Begin Olechowski recording] Our conversation convinced me to a great extent that the Germans are supporters of the gradual inclusion of Poland and Central European countries in the European security structures. Mr. Kinkel kindly said that Germany will be an advocate of Polish interests at the NATO summit. This will not be the first time because we have noted, and we often emphasize this, that Germany is the country which has been supporting in a consistent and solid manner Polish demands and aspirations concerning Western Europe, or to put it more broadly, Western institutions. [end recording]

Further on Bonn Talks

WS0401133794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Krystyna Grzybowska from Bonn: "Without Ally-Type Commitments; Olechowski and Kinkel on European Security"]

[Text] **Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski wants the terms and the timeframe for accepting Poland into NATO to be clearly defined. He paid a short working visit to Bonn. It was his first visit to Germany as the chief of Polish diplomacy.**

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said he had made a deliberate decision to invite Minister Olechowski to visit Bonn as the first foreign guest of the New Year. During the meeting the following topics were discussed: Poland's efforts to join the European Union, the Western European Union, as well as NATO—these constitute a block of issues linked with creating European security.

Minister Kinkel said during a press conference that Germany will continue to be an advocate of the Polish cause in Europe. "It is obvious," Kinkel said, "that Poland should want to leave the security grey area through its integration with NATO and with the remaining organizations of European security." According to the German foreign minister, during the NATO summit on 10 January fundamental decisions will be made concerning the opening up of NATO to the East, but it will not be possible for new countries to join the Alliance in the nearest future. Decisions will be made during the summit on coming to some agreements, but these agreements will not contain ally-type commitments. But Minister Kinkel thinks that closer cooperation between Poland and NATO will be possible; this could be —among others—joint military maneuvers or joint peace missions.

Polish public opinion has high expectations in connection with the NATO summit. "Poland wants to be a member of the Western family of countries," Minister Olechowski said, "which also means being a member of the European Union and of NATO. It will not happen tomorrow but it is our desire to have a clear and specific prospect opened up before us. Apart from Poland itself and the NATO members, nobody can decide whether we should join the Alliance or not," Minister Olechowski also stressed.

That statement corresponded to one made by Minister Kinkel. When replying to a question asked by a German journalist, Minister Kinkel recalled that during talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev he pointed out that Russia has not had the right of veto in NATO nor will it ever have it in the future, but at the same time he assured Kozyrev that Russia's sensitivity will be taken into account. The Germans are in favor of NATO adopting the kind of solution that would take into account the interests of both the countries of Central Europe and of Russia.

Minister Kinkel did not talk about "Partnership for Peace." Only Minister Olechowski mentioned it by pointing out that Poland expects the kind of partnership that would not mean giving up full membership in the future. "We can be satisfied with that part of the talks," Minister Olechowski said, and he suggested that Poland also take part in providing assistance to Russia and other eastern neighbors.

The Polish and German foreign ministers also discussed bilateral relations of our two countries, but—as Minister Kinkel said—they are so close that there are no major differences of opinions.

Olechowski Views Relations With NATO

AU0301192994 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 3 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski: "Poland and the North Atlantic Alliance"]

[Text] A sensible foreign policy should always take two viewpoints into consideration: one's own and that of the partner. For Poland, participation in NATO is the synonym for national security. For the signatories of the North Atlantic Alliance there arises the question of whether the gradual expansion of NATO by the Central European states is in their interest and, if so, whether Poland—alone or in the Visegrad group—should initiate this process. There is no doubt that these two viewpoints

are not identical. However, they can prove to be convergent, if we weigh the motives and needs, the benefits, and the potential risks for all parties involved, soberly and without prejudice.

Unfortunately any important foreign policy problem is shrouded in myth, which makes it more difficult to solve. In our case, too, there is often a strange MYTHOLOGY OF FEAR [capitals as published] that replaces realistic assessments and courageous visions.

Myth number one: In NATO it is feared that by expanding to the uncertain zone of Central and Eastern Europe, the alliance might be dragged into local conflicts, for the settlement of which it is prepared neither politically, nor militarily, nor psychologically. After all, the alliance was formed to defend the West against aggression from the outside and not to get involved in situations that do not directly threaten its members' security.

Such fears seem to be nourished by events in the former Yugoslavia. However, even if we bow in pain to the suffering of these people and entire ethnic groups, we must soberly note that the situation in the former Yugoslavia has nothing in common with the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. One can assume with certainty that potential misunderstandings between individual nationalities in this area do not harbor the danger of bloody conflicts.

This applies all the more to Poland, which is ethnically almost homogeneous and has managed in the course of the past few years to establish friendly, goodneighborly relations with all neighbors and to settle all border and nationality issues by treaties.

Myth number two: Russia is afraid of NATO. Certainly, one should not underestimate the remnants of old enemy images—in particular in the Army. Neither the solemn statement by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1990-91 nor the tell-tale changes in the doctrine and the organization of the NATO forces have been able to completely abolish this enemy image. However, this myth takes into consideration neither the changes that have already occurred nor the dynamism of the further development of Russia's relations both with NATO and its individual member states. The Russian statements that relations between NATO and Russia should be better than NATO's relations with the states in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrate how unfounded this myth is.

Instead of NATO, Russia points other states to the CSCE. We understand the efforts to strengthen the CSCE and, on principle, we share them. However, we are of the opinion that the CSCE cannot replace NATO as a collective self-defense system in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, it can and should play a more important and more effective role. Therefore, together with Germany, Russia, and other states, we are in favor of considerably expanding the powers of the CSCE, in particular in the field of conflict prevention as well as arms limitation and control.

Myth number three: Poland is afraid of Russia and, therefore, wants to isolate it from Europe with a "cordon sanitaire." This myth is particularly absurd. It is simply not possible to isolate Russia and, if it were possible, it would be a mistake. In Poland such action would be prevented by political and economic aspects as well as by strong cultural and ethnic ties. Poland is against Russia's isolation. To put it even more clearly: In our view, no European security system will work without the participation of a democratic and strong Russia—neither in the short term nor in the long run. A democratic and strong Russia will be the strongest guarantee for peace and stability in Europe.

Thus, we are not afraid of Russia but only of objective situations that might provoke it to actions dangerous to Poland. Such a case is the current security vacuum in Central Europe. "Nature abhors a vacuum," the Romans noted. In Poland's case it is particularly artificial and provoking, because it is located between two giants—Germany and Russia. The consolidation of this vacuum would provoke these two states into considering Poland either as a buffer state in the classical sense of the 19th century or as an area, where the respective spheres of influence clash. One does not need any proof that both cases would be detrimental not only to Poland's interests but also to Europe's stability. The common denominator of these three myths is easy to see. The concern and the fears do not develop from the friend-foe pattern but from the structural incompleteness of the European security system. Therefore, the construction of its new architecture is very important.

This term is, perhaps, not quite adequate as regards the current and future situation, because it lacks dynamism. At the moment, it is not so much the creation of new elements that is important but active cooperation of the already existing ones and their adjustment to the new situation. The European security architecture of the near future will not be of the classical style but rather of the baroque, with its flowing and interlaced elements.

At all levels of this construction Polish diplomacy has made an essential contribution and intends to continue doing so. We have settled the bilateral security issue with all the old and new neighbors. At the supraregional level Poland is trying to support initiatives such as the Visegrad group, the Central European Initiative, or the institutions of the Baltic Sea littoral states, which do not deal directly with political security aspects but strengthen the climate of cooperation and contribute to stability in Europe. At the pan-European level Poland has played an active role in arms limitation negotiations as well as confidence and security-building measures.

We watch the activation of the Western European Union [WEU] with great attention. We do not see the WEU as an alternative but as a supplement to NATO and consider it to be NATO's increasingly strong European

pillar. The WEU's close relation to the process of European integration makes it the natural forum of cooperation between those states, which have—like Poland—already linked their future with this integration.

At the global level we recognize the need to strengthen the powers and functions of the UN Security Council in safeguarding and reestablishing peace.

Thus, we are convinced that European security must be established at different levels in different forms. I can describe our altitude by paraphrasing the proverb that "everything is politics, but politics is not everything." The same goes for the question of the North Atlantic Alliance: "Everything is linked with NATO, but NATO alone is not everything for Europe's security."

At the same time, we are firmly convinced that NATO remains irreplaceable for the foreseeable future. First, as an anchor safeguarding the United States of Europe, one that we consider absolutely indispensable as a guarantor of peace on the continent and Poland's security. Second, as a mechanism that ensures the harmless self-realization of German power in harmony with the interests of other European peoples. Third, as the only fully organized, experienced, and powerful military organization that would be able to stand up to a potential aggressor. Fourth, as an alliance of peoples who represent common values rooted in Greek culture, Roman law, and Christian religion.

I have already mentioned that Poland does not mean any threat to NATO in the sense of a "Balkanization." Even more: As a member of NATO, Poland would not only not be a burden but would even be a trump card. The increasingly consolidated political stability, the continuity of the economic reforms, the visible signs of an economic upswing, the strengthening of civilian control over the military—all this makes Poland an increasingly essential element of European order and democracy in this part of the continent—and this in its most sensitive geostrategic area, in the narrowing between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathians.

Above all, however, accepting Poland into NATO would be a first step toward ending the division of Europe into different security areas and levels. This would be the beginning of an evolution of the European security system toward indivisibility, universality, and mutuality.

A process aimed at a specific goal: Apart from a handful of Polish politicians who demanded the immediate acceptance of Poland into NATO in spring 1992, all serious political parties and the overwhelming majority of our people agree that Poland's membership in NATO will be preceded by a complicated process. Both in Poland and abroad, a number of ideas for step-by-step solutions and partial approaches have emerged. We brush none of them aside right from the beginning. We will insist on only one criterion: The purpose and goal of these projects must be Poland's approach to full membership in NATO—and not putting it off, feeding it with hopes, or pushing it on the sidetrack of half-way solutions.

This also applies to the particularly topical initiative of the "partnership for peace" that U.S. President Clinton has proposed. We see it as an important initiative for a Europe that is not divided into blocs or security spheres and that would be characterized by democratic values, rule-of-law principles, free market economy, and the openness of European society toward the extra-European world. This shows that the initiative of the "partnership for peace" should extend to all countries that fulfill these conditions. It should, however, also clearly communicate (to the interested states) the final goal—namely membership in the Atlantic Alliance for those who fulfill the specific criteria. The lack of such a prospect would reduce the support of the parliaments and the public for the idea of a "partnership for peace" in the affected countries and also the dynamism of the initiative. There would be the impression that the West wanted to keep these countries in a "gray zone of insecurity" forever. This would give rise to a trend toward nationalist tendencies in these countries, provoke a negative attitude toward international cooperation, and make them withdraw like a snail into their own shell. At the same time, imperialist desires might again emerge in neighboring states.

The framework agreement on the partnership should not be general. On the contrary, it should set down as precisely as possible the criteria and conditions for participating in the "partnership for peace," including: Transparency of the military budgets, civilian supervision of the armed forces, non-deployment of armed forces on foreign territory without approval by the affected states, observing all obligations in the field of disarmament, arms control, as well as security and confidence-building measures.

The "partnership for peace" should also further develop the contents of Article 4 of the Washington Agreement, by noting, for instance, that the consultations envisaged there in the case of a threat to the inviolability of the territory, the political independence, or the security of one or several partners, can also lead to common action with the goal of safeguarding or reestablishing peace.

In addition, bilateral agreements on specific fields and forms of cooperation with NATO should make it possible to take into consideration the specific geographical location, the interests, needs, and security problems of the individual countries as well as their progress in the process of democratization. This would result in a positive diversification of forms and scope of cooperation.

I hope that the NATO summit will take our proposals into consideration and publicly state its conviction that the security of Poland and the other Central European countries is part of NATO's basic interests—because their security is closely linked with NATO's own security.

Pawlak on Talks With U.S. Chamber of Commerce

LD0401124794 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 4 Jan 93

[Text] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak today met members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. According

to Prime Minister Pawlak the results of the economic transformations in Poland are appreciated by international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

[Begin Pawlak recording] In 1994 we expect that Polish gross domestic product to grow by about 4.5 percent, exports to increase by 6 percent and investment by 6 percent. We envisage that the annual rate of inflation in this period will decrease, falling to about 25 percent. The government is continuing the process of reforms, the foundation of which is formed by a market economy and the principle of free economic management, as well as by the demonopolization of foreign economic relations.

The government will also continue the processes of ownership transformations, although here we want to use the criterion of efficiency as the primary criterion. We are interested in creating conditions for a free flow of goods, services, capital and people. At the same time we need a greater openness of foreign markets to our goods, as well as increased interest of foreign entrepreneurs in investment projects in Poland. [end recording]

Walesa's Press Aide on President's Term, Media

WS0401110094 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Interview with Andrzej Drzycimski, press spokesman for President Lech Walesa, by Piotr Swiac on the "Directly From the Belvedere" program; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Swiac] Mr. Minister, since this is our first interview in the New Year, I would like to ask you to recap last year. President Lech Walesa is not satisfied with the year 1993.

[Drzycimski] Everyone has a kind of dissatisfaction because the development of democracy in Poland—which by the way could be seen in this past year—could have resulted in more achievements and in bringing about greater effects, the kind of effects whose impact the citizens of the country would feel directly; and I mean they would have to feel a very clear impact in a legislative sense, the kind of legislation which would allow the overcoming of some deadlocks, especially in the economic area, and which would allow moving on with issues that have been dragging for years now, beginning with the famous issue of the Treasury, and also of customs stamping [banderolowanie] and many other issues as well. These issues have been debated, deliberated on, and dealt with many times, but they subsequently dragged slowly either through Sejm commissions or during later Sejm debates, and so these issues required a push. And that kind of push was exactly what was missing. And that is precisely what the waste of time is about, that is ....

[Swiac, interrupting] But Mr. Minister, I am sorry to interrupt you like this, but many people accuse the president of having submitted relatively few legislative initiatives.

[Drzycimski] The president has focused on the main issues that constitute the state and its structures, he has focused mainly on the legal framework defining the political system of the country, including having submitted a few legislative proposals aimed at—first of all—the Electoral Laws, the constitutional system, that is the Small Constitution, a proposal for a constitutional framework for the country in the future—these factors determine the political system's nature. Recently we also had the president submit a Rights and Freedoms Charter, he also submitted a proposal for making the Constitutional Tribunal independent—all these determine and constitute a democratic and sovereign state with three clear pillars: The parliament, the executive authority, and the judiciary.

[Swiac] In that case, could one not have a grievance precisely against the president about his lack of efficiency? After all, efficiency is something that should be present at a post this high.

[Drzycimski] Well, I can you see you are going back to a constitutional dispute, a dispute on what Poland should be like: Should it be a democracy of a presidential-parliamentary type, or should it be one of a parliamentary-cabinet type? The president's view is that deciding in favor of one or the other option is a question of choice. But he also thinks that in this transitional period that we are in—by the way, it is not just him but also many legal experts and politicians think that, too—the executive authority should be strengthened to make it more effective and to render it able to make decisions faster. That is why the president is in favor of a presidential-parliamentary system, but he also says the issue remains open, and the decision is up to the nation, and we will certainly debate the Constitution.

[Swiac] December was the third anniversary of Lech Walesa's term as president, and on that occasion, former prime ministers of the Third Republic expressed their views on the president's term. There were some positive views expressed but there were also plenty of critical ones. Tadeusz Mazowiecki would like Lech Walesa to contribute to returning the presidency to its grand qualities, so as to prevent the person performing the state's supreme post from getting involved in immediate political maneuvers.

[Drzycimski] But you ignored here other views which were expressed as well.

[Swiac] Fine, let us take another statement. Former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski said: To me, President Lech Walesa is a major disappointment.

[Drzycimski] But you still left out some other statements.

[Swiac] I am sure there were also other kinds of views but I would like to hear you comment on what I cited.

[Drzycimski] You seem to be citing here only critical statements made on the presidency, and it is a good thing that we have them. It is not the case that a politician or even the state as a whole can function without any arguments. It is good that the president has been arousing such passionate debates since everyone has a right to think in his own mind, as it were, about what it is that he expects—using his own judgment—from the president. Not only we here in Poland have been making judgments, but also the world has been judging us, so let us look from the perspective of that broader kind of view. Our domestic, Polish view is important—by all means—in terms of our achievements and failures, and on this issue there are all kinds of things to be listed. But what is also important is the view of Poland from the perspective of our current position in Europe and the world. The time of peace, the time of political stabilization and of this kind of special treatment of Poland so to speak—this is all over. And it is only thanks to Poland being so active, thanks to the president's initiatives and proposals finding their way not only to the desks [presumably of foreign politicians], but also contributing to the debate, I would even say they are a cause of this major debate on the future of Europe.

[Swiac] Mr. Minister, but let us go back to domestic issues. Would you not agree with me that during this past year the president's measures have not been perceived very well by society, and there are some results of research conducted by agencies which deal with that kind of work, to back it up? I think the views expressed by the press on the president have also been getting worse and worse.

[Drzycimski] The president has become a lightning-rod of his own kind. If something bad happens or if something inappropriate is going on—who is to blame? Lech Walesa. Why? Because of this and that, and then the list goes on and on. But nobody pays attention to the fact that if the president was really responsible for all that is expected of him .... [pauses] He has not been given enough powers. That is why the president says: Let us establish some fundamentals and some principles which would be the state's pillars, or a fundamental plan. He has been saying that over and over again for years now. Every new governing team or coalition that takes over power says: Yes, that is correct. We can hear such views also in the case of this latest coalition. But once the time comes for implementing that in practice, these coalitions kind of take back what they had said. The mass media evaluate President Lech Walesa by judging from first looks, as it were, and they are not making an effort to look for a deeper kind of measure, while I think that....

[Swiac, interrupting] Mr. Minister, perhaps this deeper kind of measure that you are talking about should be made more specific. One can conclude from what you are saying that there is no understanding, or that there is no transformation of the president's ideas into practical measures, while I think the mass media are an excellent means to accomplishing just that.

[Drzycimski] Yes. This very program here can serve as an example. After all, this television program which began last year, serves to familiarize society with what the president does. Of course one can debate whether the program's formula is good or bad, but from the letters that have been coming into the President's Office and to me personally, I perceive something different: Namely, it can be concluded from those letters that the program has been enjoying an ever-increasing social interest, and that is because in one way or another it shows those parts of what the president does which were absent from the media for two years. Only those aspects were present which were one-sided, so to speak: They were full of criticism and oftentimes also of a lot of sarcasm. What the president has been trying to convey—that is the need to build a system—was ignored. I also mean the need to establish a strategy not just for a year or two, not for the duration of a coalition or two, but the kind of measures with which we will enter the new century.

[Swiac] Mr. Minister, but I hope it is not your intention to accuse the mass media of bad faith?

[Drzycimski] No, no.

[Swiac] So in that case, where is the fundamental error?

[Drzycimski] I think it is in that .... [pauses] That is quite normal, it is quite a typical phenomenon; I think it occurs in every place like Poland where after a period of censorship—which we all know existed before 1989—the mass media gained enormous freedom. There is an enormous freedom in Poland in that regard. But what is missing is what I would describe as the responsibility factor. There are more and more frequent cases of—and I am saying that with satisfaction— a sense of being responsible for the country, for what we have been doing, and for the fact that Poland's image is also being shaped by the mass media.

ΩMinister Presents Copyright Law to Parliament

94P20164A

[Editorial Report] In presenting the draft of a new copyright law to the Sejm on 18 November, Polish Minister of Culture Kazimierz Dejmek argued that the existing 1952 law is outdated and that the new law takes into account current technologies and economic realities. KRONIKA SEJMOWA of 24 November reported Dejmek's remarks to the effect that the draft contained improvements over the previous version, which he said had been revised to make Polish law more compatible with European and world standards. This, Dejmak predicted, will make participation in international copyright agreements possible and "will enable Poland to fulfill obligations resulting from previous accords, in particular those resulting from the trade treaties with the U.S."

Dejmek said, according to the KRONIKA SEJMOWA report, that the law was designed to provide equal protection to authors and artists, as well as to the producers and distributors of cultural products. He also noted that the law delegates oversight responsibilities to professional organizations of authors, artists, performers, and producers, while at the same time exercising control over them by licensing requirements. To mitigate the negative impact of the illicit copying of cultural products, the law provides that losses due to such pirated production will be compensated by fees on blank tapes and videocassettes.

Zdzislaw Podkanski, a spokesman for one of the parties in the governing coalition, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), said that the copyright law would bring economic as well as cultural benefits. According to Podkanski, the new law both "meets the expectations of the artistic associations and satisfies the requirements of international pacts and treaties." He also endorsed the law's criminal penalties, which he said should serve to deter "pirating" of copyrighted materials.

Jerzy Zdrada of the opposition Democratic Union described the existing Polish copyright law as "anachronistic" because it "does not reflect the standard legal practice of the European Union and the United States." The failure to change the old law until now, he charged, has impeded domestic scientific, technological, and cultural activities and hampered international trade relations. He said that the new law, which is based on West European models, should rectify this situation.

Speaking for the opposition Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), Deputy Janusz Koza regretted that the copyright law had not been passed earlier because "every day of delay causes great losses for the state treasury, businesses, and individuals." He complained that, currently, the illegal production of tapes, videocassettes, and computer software is encouraged by "the impunity of pirates." These pirates, he said, penetrate not only the domestic market but also "markets of neighboring countries." They pay "neither taxes nor duties" and, selling their products at much lower prices, "they ruin legitimate businesses."

PD-FSN Sends Protest Letter to Iliescu

AU0301164594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] The Democratic Party-National Salvation Front [PD-FSN] has faxed us the text of an open letter addressed by that party to President Ion Iliescu. Among other things, the letter says, quote, we express our sorrow, disillusion, and great concern caused by the fact that, over the short period of time that elapsed since your talks with the representatives of the PD-FSN, a dangerous record was achieved in the violation of the rules any democratic regime ought to follow through the elimination of some of the essential offices in parliament as well as by the intensification of the unspeakable attacks against the opposition, in a new campaign launched by the representatives of the current state power, beginning with the head of the executive and ending with the leaders of the extremist parties belonging to the ruling majority.

We are certain that you are well aware of all these facts, but we would still like to remind you of an extremely grave act that totally despises parliamentary norms, namely the way in which the draft bill empowering the government to rule by ordinances was discussed and passed in parliament. That regrettable moment is an embarrassing world premiere in this domain: A normative act was passed while parliament lacked the constitutionally established quorum. Unfortunately, that is not a solitary case, as a large number of representatives of the current state power, both in the government and in parliament, are systematically trying to put the opposition in a situation that is inconceivable in truly law-governed states, obviously intending to make it capitulate unconditionally under the pressure of abuse and discriminating and discretionary acts that also include menaces with penal sanctions, unquote.

After emphasizing the need for the accomplishment of a national pact, the letter outlines the key ideas and principles of the pact that the PD-FSN has repeatedly proposed. It then defines the concepts of a national pact, national interest, the structure of the pact, the economic pact, the social pact, and the political pact.

Silajdzic Calls For International Action

LD0301142994 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0615 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Report on a telephone interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Sarajevo by an unidentified correspondent on 2 January; Silajdzic speaks in English fading into German translation—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer Wolfgang Labuhn] Yesterday we asked Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina since last October, about the prospects for his country in 1994. Via a satellite telephone link to his official residence in the Bosnian capital, we asked him first of all how the people of Sarajevo experienced the New Year.

[Silajdzic] Here in Sarajevo it was the same as it has been over the last year. Five people died and 35 were injured on New Year's Eve. [passage indistinct] First, we have to come to a negotiated settlement, something that is unlikely because of the Serb position. The second possibility is that the international community should finally do its duty and intervene to end the aggression and the genocide directed against Bosnia- Herzegovina. The third possibility also involves the intervention of the international community, but for the victim, whose state and people are a member of the United Nations. In imposing an embargo against us, the international community has intervened for the first time in favor of the aggressor. Our hands are now tied and we have been suffering this aggression for two years now. There is no doubt that genocide is being committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international community will not let us defend ourselves. We have taken part in negotiations, we have tried our best. Because the international community is not prepared to use force, the Serb negotiators are practically ignoring it.

[Correspondent] Mr. Silajdzic, you are demanding that the international community intervene. What should be the aim of foreign intervention—merely a military victory over the Serbs, or the complete reestablishment of the former territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Government?

[Silajdzic] The aim is clearly defined in the UN Charter as well as in the resolutions of the UN Security Council, the CSCE, the World Human Rights Conference, etc. The aim would be to end the genocide and to restore order in this region on the basis of the UN Charter of international law. This is to stop the aggression directed against Bosnia-Herzegovina if the aggressor does not want to conclude a real peace. Unfortunately, we cannot make peace—we have not made war. Neither do we have the means to (?conclude) peace. One thing is important—lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is argued, would only add fuel to the fire in Bosnia. But we all know that our postwar peace rested on a balance of power and that principle worked for 50 years. Precisely this principle, alongside many others, has been abandoned in Bosnia-Herzegovina. You have said that we will not give you weapons, but we cannot help you either.

The outcome is very clear and it is that the Serb aggressors have conquered Bosnian territory and are naturally refusing to withdraw because no force is used against them. They are dealing with a defenseless population with very few arms. This imbalance is leading to yet more war. If there is a balance of forces there is no war. That is the problem we have. We hope the time has come to take action, either by restoring this balance so that we can make peace ourselves through the balance of forces, or by the international community either putting pressure on the Serbs or intervening itself.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that you will not return to the Geneva negotiating table to discuss the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which foresees the division of your country into three parts, a Muslim, a Croatian and a Serb part?

[Silajdzic] I think it was very explicit from the statement that I gave you that we are looking for a negotiated solution. We have taken part in all negotiating processes and are still prepared to do so. But our people are dying every day while we travel from one meeting to the next. Civilians are dying every day in our towns, in Sarajevo, in Mostar, in Tuzla, in Zenica, and in other towns. It is like a medieval siege of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an aggression and, without any doubt, genocide. The international community therefore has an obligation, and if negotiations fail, then other measures have to be taken.

Otherwise, the Bosnians must assume that they have been condemned to death by the international community. Many people in Bosnia already believe that by its attitude, by its wish not to get involved, the international community has intervened on the part of the aggressor, has facilitated the position of the aggressor by disarming us and has thus condemned us to death.

Ganic Says Owen Plan 'Will Resolve Nothing'

LD0301230594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, today gave an interview to VJESNIK of Zagreb, the Slovene daily VECER, and FERAL of Split.

I am not an optimist when it comes to signing the agreement as envisaged by Lord Owen. Both the agreement and its draft will resolve nothing in Bosnia. In other words, it is merely an academic paper that neither tackles the essence nor raises the main issues facing this state.

We would like to avoid the war option but we expect Serbia to launch a new attack. The regime in Serbia sees the continuation of the war as crucial for its survival. However, they are not as strong as they think they are.

They have artillery, criminal units, but they have no popular army. On the opposite side they are facing an army of volunteers.

As for the Croatian state, which has disintegrated on all fronts and which is trying to step up its aggression against a sovereign state, it is obvious that Tudjman's behavior is preparing the ground for sanctions against Croatia, Ganic stressed.

In eastern Bosnia, we will not allow homes and the land belonging to Bosniak Muslims to be taken over by a single Serb family. My message to the Serbs is this: Do not go there, do not move into houses and land that belong to someone else. Something terrible will happen to you, today, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, or in six months, it does not matter. Those whom you have expelled have nowhere to go. They are strangers in both Sarajevo and Vienna. The solution is to return these people to where they came from, Ganic said.

The proposal for a union [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] will be difficult to implement, Ganic said. If we are to accept the proposal, at least 1 million people will have to be resettled. To resettle them we would need at least $2 million daily or about $700 million annually to relieve the misery of these people. The union proposal is not a serious one because it does not reflect reality. We are not in the process of setting up a Muslim state. We want to create a state of Bosnia with Croats, Serbs, and Bosniak Muslims living in it. I think that the idea of a Muslim state was planted on us and has, in the meantime, become transparent. Here the feeling of patriotism is much stronger than any other passion. I am in favor of Bosnia as a state of Bosniak Muslims, Serbs, and Croats but am not in favor of an artificial peace. I advocate the rule of law.

It is realistic to expect a turnabout in Croatia's policy in Bosnia. Its policy will hit rock bottom unless Tudjman has reached an agreement to hand over the occupied territories in Croatia to Milosevic. This would signal an end to Croatia as a state, Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, said in his interview to VJESNIK and VECER.

Cot Says UN Troops 'Ready' To Intervene

LD0301214494 Paris France-2 Television Network in French 1900 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] General Jean Cot, who was the guest of our 1300 bulletin, live from Zagreb, denounced the humiliations inflicted upon the Blue Helmet UN soldiers on the ground. The UN Protection Forces commander in chief also said that his troops are ready for a potential offensive intervention, should the United Nations give the green light, of course:

[Begin Cot recording] My freedom of action is more restricted than I would like; this will come as no surprise to you, because I am not here to wage a war, for instance. I think, however, that we can do two things. First, we should be firmer in our attitude toward the Bosnian Serbs in particular, since they are the ones who are hampering our freedom of action most at the moment. I was able to verify this during the long week I spent there. Also—and this is the message I am striving to put across—we should exert pressure in Geneva, including on our negotiators.

To me, it seems impossible that, on the one hand, we should behave like nice mediators and have polite conversations with the political and military officials of former Yugoslavia while, on the other hand, our force on the ground is being subjected to increasing pressure and even humiliation. Therefore, I cannot emphasize enough to Geneva—and I would also like to put this message across to New York—that we must probably put the brakes on, and we cannot be nice in Geneva while we suffer on the ground.

We retaliate every time our rules allow us to do so, that is to say, every time we face a direct attack, believe me. As a result, we do not suffer. You will, however, understand that when the lives of some 3 million men and women in Bosnia-Herzegovina are at stake, we have to swallow our pride, which is sometimes difficult. However, I do not think we should swallow our honor. Where do you draw the line between both, where is the threshold? I will decide. [end recording]

Karadzic Comments on Relations With UN Troops

AU0301194694 Pristina TVP Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Statement by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic after talks with (Sergio Demel), adviser to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, in Pale on 3 January—recorded]

[Text] We have agreed that there is no animosity between the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] and the Serb side, that the Serbs are very cooperative in that respect, but that some [humanitarian] convoys are being delayed because of irregularities in the convoys themselves. Either there is no permission to search the entire convoy, or there are too many people or things, and our soldiers abide strictly to what they have on their lists. We might show a bit more flexibility toward UNPROFOR there. However, we do have to be somewhat cautious since the Muslims are doubtless getting weapons and ammunition, that is beyond any doubt.

We would never accuse the UNPROFOR Command. We know that General Briquemont and all his officers are exceptionally professional and honorable soldiers, but individuals are probably smuggling arms for money. We have to be very cautious there as we do not want the war to be prolonged.

Prlic Asks Croatia To Annul Recognition of B-H

LD0301192394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Jan 94

[Text] Jadranko Prlic, president of the government of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, has sent a letter to the Government of Croatia in reaction to the conduct of the Muslim side and the latest developments in central Bosnia.

In his letter Jadranko Prlic notes that at their last session the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the government of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna discussed the political and military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina with special emphasis on the course of negotiations on the future political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The common view is that in the negotiations so far, the Croat delegation has made most concessions and that any further concessions to other sides in the negotiations would not only place the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in an unequal position toward the two other constituent nations but would directly threaten its survival.

The Muslim army continues to attack the Croat people, especially in central Bosnia. At the same time top Muslim politicians have openly threatened to pursue their territorial conquest of the centuries-old Croat homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In view of the above, the Republic of Croatia is called on to reexamine its overall relations with the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina where—contrary to its constitution—decisions are now being made by authorities that are exclusively under Muslim control.

The letter also contains a request to annul the document by which the Republic of Croatia recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, in view of the fact that since the recognition major changes have been made in the foundations of constitutionality of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the fact that the Muslim side has achieved illegitimate dominance.

In addition, we ask the Republic of Croatia to end its participation in the talks on the future organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina unless the Muslim side halts its offensive in central Bosnia and provides firm guarantees that it will end its aggression against our people, the president of the government of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna says in his letter to the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

Zepce Official Analyzes 'Betrayal' of Town

AU0301204394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Jan 93

[Statement by Sefik Teslic, president of the Zepce War Presidency, to Sarajevo Radio; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] The town of Zepce and parts of the commune are temporarily occupied by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and its most extremist segment, the ustashas. However, there is a large part of the territory that is free. We have consolidated there, politically and militarily, as a precondition for the liberation of the entire territory and linking with the surrounding territories of Tesanj, Maglaj, and Teslic communes.

The true faces of all who were, until yesterday, our alleged friends and neighbors have been clearly shown by the example of Zepce. The ustashas and the chetniks have jointly done what they have done. However, I am truly puzzled that the Serbs have forgotten what the ustashas have done [words indistinct] they have committed a massacre upon the innocent civilians on that occasion, but are now friends with a common objective of destroying everything Muslim.

The trust in neighbors, peace, and respect for oneself and one's property has backfired on Zepce in the most brutal possible way. Bearing in mind the betrayal and humiliating surrender of a great part of the command and soldiers, a clear message remains to all Zepce residents regardless of where they are: To those who have not done so yet, join a brigade as quickly as possible; to those who can help in any other possible way, do this immediately to help the brigade that has been formed very hastily with the help of other brigades which are situated on the free territory of Zepce commune and which are taking an active part in the combat.

We shall return to Zepce. We do not doubt this. We will punish all criminals, ustashas, and Mate Boban. To those who did not bloody their hands and commit crimes, we will guarantee freedom and life together. We know who the criminals are and what they have done, and they have done many things not befitting civilized people.

Tudjman Interviewed on Balkan Conflicts

LD0301202894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Studio interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by correspondents Mirjana Rakic, Denis Latin, and Darko Herceg in Zagreb; correspondents not individually identified—live]

[Text] [Correspondent] Mr. President, let us begin with the world. What is the greatest achievement of Croatia's foreign policy in 1994 [as heard]?

[Tudjman] I think that we could agree that the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 871—which contains all previous resolutions and whereby the UN's most authoritative body confirmed as never before Croatia's territorial integrity and its right to Croatian territory under the protection of the peacekeeping forces, and directly linked the solving of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sanctions against Serbia, which caused everything that is going on in the UN protected areas and Bosnia, and the solving of the crisis not only in Bosnia, but also in Croatia. It seems to me that this is the most important event in the sphere of foreign policy.

In internal affairs, I think that we could agree that the most important event was the Maslenica operation with which we linked northern Croatia with Dalmatian Croatia, as well as the latest successes of the Croatian Government in curbing inflation.

[Correspondent] These were the achievements. However, what have we not managed to do in 1994 [as heard], primarily in our contacts with the world?

[Tudjman] Obviously, we have not managed to solve our main problem—that is, the problem of the territories that are under occupation—to integrate the Croatian areas into Croatia's constitutional and legal system. Of course, we have not managed to do that because of the overall international situation; due to the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the war in Bosnia, and the current circumstances in the world.

[Correspondent] Speaking about the world and conditions on the international scene, hasn't the international community shown a lack of understanding?

[Tudjman] The international community has shown not only a lack of understanding, but also disunity. Europe does not know what to do with the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The world does not know either, including the main world power—the United States. We could say that they mishandled this hot chestnut of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is objectively a very complex issue. But it is still surprising to see how disunited Europe and the United Nations, and the United States, were, and with how much disunity and unresourcefulness they tackled the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, that is the reason why we have to this day found no solution, and this is why we are still uncertain as to who will say the final world in solving the crisis.

[Correspondent] From the point of view of the international community in general, Bosnia-Herzegovina is the main problem and especially Croatia's attitude to this neighboring state. Our attitude to Bosnia-Herzegovina has changed during the war and, in general, as time passed. Mr. President, what are the relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo at present?

[Tudjman] I would not say that our attitude to Bosnia-Herzegovina has been changing. Right from the beginning we advocated the preservation of a single Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, we were aware of the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina could not survive as a unitary state. If Yugoslavia could not survive in the period of the collapse of not only socialism but also multinational state creations, it is obvious that a single Bosnia had no chance of survival—a Bosnia in which differences are even greater than those in former Yugoslavia. Our policy has been consistent. We favored the preservation of Bosnia. We advised Croats there to take part in the referendum on Bosnia's independence. We were willing to accept the cantonal, confederal organization that was proposed by Ambassador Cutilheiro. We were also willing to accept a division of Bosnia into provinces, i.e. the Vance-Owen plan, and finally a proposal on the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina republics, hoping to develop cooperation with the Muslims. We exerted special efforts by signing agreements—the ones known to the public and even those yet to be revealed when the right time comes.

Izetbegovic's leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina has given consent to these agreements, but Sarajevo, its Muslim leadership, has continued with the policy of the continuation of the war against the Croats and for the conquest of those areas envisaged, for instance the Croat-majority province that later became the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. Unable to recapture the areas they lost in the Serbian aggression, they wanted to take the Croat territories and they are now even threatening the Croatian enclaves in central Bosnia. This is where the problem lies. For our part, we tried to involve the Turkish Government in influencing Muslim policy. None of this has had any result so far, and for us it is a sensitive issue: Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are threatened by a Muslim offensive, even genocide, while we in Croatia are looking after hundreds of thousands of Muslims, among others. We have to exert special efforts to make our people understand this, and we shall continue to do everything in our power to achieve friendship with the Muslims for the sake of the future and for the sake of joint strategic interests.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, a short while ago you said that the greatest task we have not managed to perform is the full integration of all parts of Croatian territory. It is evident to everyone that this is a very complicated process which will probably continue. Tell

us about the results of your policy. Should one have perhaps have opted for some other policy, either a more radical policy or a softer one?

[Tudjman] Understandably, whenever any kind of problem is at issue there are various attitudes and differing views. I believe that, if our past experience is anything to go by, we can conclude—this will be certainly confirmed from a historical perspective—that we have been pursuing the sole effective policy, the only purposeful policy. Despite the unfavorable circumstances surrounding the creation of an independent and democratic Croatia, we have nevertheless managed to create an independent, democratic, and sovereign Croatia. We managed to resist Serbian aggression at a time when this Serbia and its greater Serbian programs had the entire armed forces of the Yugoslav communist army at its disposal.

You know, since you raised this question, I have read in our newspapers about views to the effect that a more resolute plan should have been applied in tackling this Serbian aggression led by the Yugoslav Army. I have recently come across a book by General Kadijevic, the [former] Yugoslav secretary of national defense, who openly reveals that the Yugoslav Army, that Belgrade planned to conquer at all costs both Zagreb and Varazdin while waiting for an excuse. They needed a pretext. Consequently, this policy of ours, this policy of negotiations—while simultaneously creating our police and military forces out of nothing, and of accepting internationalisation, i.e. the Vance plan—was the only viable one. In this way we prevented Croatia from being completely destroyed.

We reconciled ourselves, temporarily, to having one fourth of Croatian territory—at that time it was one third of Croatian territory—placed under the peace force's protection although our adversary was also duty-bound to agree to have these paramilitary Serbian formations disarmed and to the incorporation of these areas into Croatia's constitutional system. This was not done because this disunited world tolerated the Serbian aggression. In this world there are very influential, responsible factors, not only factors but forces, too, which did not want to see an independent Croatia, which, toward the end of 1991, even desired Croatia's defeat in the war.

Therefore, in those circumstances we could not have achieved more than we did. We obtained Croatia's international recognition and the international community's consent—in the form of the most authoritative resolutions, as I said in answer to the first question—that at any cost all areas currently held by Serbia are part of Croatia's territorial integrity, and that a solution should be found for them to be integrated by political means. Of course, we accepted this policy to prevent the war from spreading and to avoid further destruction and more victims. Therefore, if one looks at the current situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia, in Europe and in the world, and if one looks at the search for a way of establishing international order in this region, I think that we can conclude that we have conducted a good policy.

[Correspondent] What the opposition holds against you most often are your talks with Milosevic. Would it not have been better had you not held talks with him, and what would have happened if you had not held talks with Milosevic?

[Tudjman] First, it was not only I who held talks with him, but all European and world diplomatic factors, including those who were trying to replace [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic with King Karadjordjevic, [former FRY Prime Minister Milan] Panic, and other opposition politicians, and also with [former FRY President Dobrica] Cosic and [Serbian Renewal Movement leader] Vuk Draskovic. But at the end, they reached the conclusion that he is the only politician who has power in Serbia today, and who should be talked to. Therefore, that was not my own decision, but the true state of affairs which did not depend on me. And, of course, one talks with one's opponents to achieve peace.

Our orientation, of course, could not have been only war because in terms of weapons we were inferior. As I have said, the Yugoslav Army—the third or fourth strongest military power in Europe—was against us, and we were disarmed, I mean, without an army, without arms. Therefore, both because of the situation and because of the influence of the international community, we had to turn to talks.

To those who say that I should not have talked with Milosevic: Isn't the Israeli prime minister holding talks with 'Arafat; aren't all of them, including the French president, not only the cochairmen of the European conference but also such statesmen as the French president, talking with Milosevic? This is a shallow political approach, because our meeting aimed at creating prerequisites for a peaceful political solution and the absence of talks would lead to a deepening of the conflict, of the war, which the world was not willing to accept. The world, responsible international factors, have demanded, drawn our attention to the need to reach a political solution and normalize relations between Croatia and Serbia.

[Correspondent] I would be interested to hear some of your assessments. First, is there any likelihood that Serbia might provoke a new war and attack Croatia?

[Tudjman] I think not. During the talks we had on the basis of the present situation in which Croatia has already developed its own armed force, its own army, and in which the Yugo-communist army abandoned or was forced to abandon most Croatian territory, including Prevlaka and the whole of the Adriatic. [sentence as heard]

You see, one of the first European observers, Ambassador Van Hauten, the observer of the European Community, told me once in reference to the situation in

former Yugoslavia, in Croatia: President, I cannot understand some of your people. They do not seem to see what is happening. You have succeeded, you have disarmed barracks, entire garrisons, and the Yugoslav Army; the Yugoslav Navy is leaving Pula and Rijeka—they were still on Vis at that time. This is something that rarely happens in history.

In other words, in the situation we found ourselves the only way of gaining our own state, of preserving it, and achieving international recognition, was of course by resisting the aggression, by not allowing ourselves to be subjugated, and at the same time by aligning our policy with the policy of world factors to show them that we in Croatia are not a bunch of irresponsible people who wanted to set either the Balkans or the world on fire. Rather we wanted to achieve freedom, democracy, and sovereignty, in line with current international views.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, are the rebels in Croatia prepared to wage some kind of a war and is Croatia today prepared to respond to absolutely every attack?

[Tudjman] I haven't finished answering your first question, which is linked to this one. In such circumstances—given present developments—we have reached a stage in which today's Serbia or their Yugoslavia are no longer capable of starting a large-scale war against Croatia for many reasons: it was not capable of conquering Croatia in the initial period, it faced international isolation and sanctions, its economic situation is catastrophic, and finally, because all levels, even the most responsible ones, of the Serbian political leadership and also of society have realized that they should work on the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations on the basis of mutual recognition, as a prerequisite for emerging from the kind of crisis which has befallen Serbia. Hence there is no direct threat of some Serbian offensive. Even if it took place it would be no threat to Croatia. Today, Croatia has an armed force which is capable of deterring this. There is no threat either of Serbs in Croatian areas under peace protection launching some kind of offensive.

Let me reply to something our people abroad are interested in. We have opted, we have resolutely opted for finding a solution in a peaceful way by guaranteeing the Serbian ethnic community not only all civil rights but all ethnic rights too, territorial autonomy in the two districts, Knin and Glina, where they are in the majority. We also advocate their gradual integration into the restoration of the infrastructure and the entire economic and legal system of Croatia. We have also made it clear that if this is not accepted we will be able to resolve this by other means today.

[Correspondent] The Croatian Army is entirely prepared for this. You have recently said that in the army there must be neither leftwing nor rightwing tendencies. The army must strictly implement state policies. Are there any tendencies within the army toward political interference in the organization of some parts of the Croatian Army?

[Tudjman] First of all, the military system of every country, including Croatia, is such that the army is an instrument of state policy. We must assume this point of view, particularly so in a young state, a young emerging army, in a country which is also subjected to the presence of foreign aggression, foreign occupation, as these Croatian areas placed under the protection of the peace force are in fact under Belgrade's occupation. Belgrade is sending in not only arms but personnel, too, including officers and even generals and admirals.

Consequently, there is a great deal of justifiable discontent among the Croatian people, and even among the ranks of the Croatian Army because these formations of ours know that they would be capable of settling accounts with these Serbian occupation formations as they demonstrated in the Maslenica and Gospic operations. There is also impatience. Understandably, in my capacity as a head of state and supreme commander, I demand that the army implement policies.

It means that they are implementing a policy of uging a peaceful resolution in order not to cause further destruction of Croatia and further casualties, and because, as you already know, the international community demands from us such efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution. You know that an atmosphere was created as if Croatia were preparing an all-out offensive against those areas; we received open threats, these threats being well-founded, that they would introduce sanctions against Croatia as well. Of course, we wanted to avoid that and therefore we are pursuing a policy of the kind we are discussing, and therefore we are not going to allow any different, separate policies. This would be detrimental to the interests of the Croatian state and of the Croatian people.

[Correspondent] Let us return to the Serbs in Croatia. Are you ready to offer something more to make them part of the constitution?

[Tudjman] First of all, in this regard, I consider our constitution to be at the level of the most advanced international constitutions. In the preamble to the constitution we said that Croatia is a national state of the Croatian people, but also a state of its citizens of all other nationalities, ethnic communities, minorities living in Croatia. We said this in order to show that after many centuries, the Croatian people have achieved their sovereignty.

But in the first article of our constitution we said that we do not speak of some kind of a national state, but we say that Croatia is a state of its citizens. Therefore, there is no need for us to change anything in our constitution, particularly in our constitutional law. In accordance with demands set by the international community and the international conference on former Yugoslavia, we passed the constitutional law in which we guarantee civil

and ethnic rights to ethnic communities and national minorities, including the Serbs in Croatia. We also say there that the Serbs have the right to cultural autonomy, but also to territorial autonomy in those areas where they are a majority—in Knin and in Glina.

Therefore, there is no need for constitutional changes, but there is a need for implementation. Implementation of these principles can only come after an agreement has been reached not only with the so-called local Serbs, but also with Belgrade because, as I have just said, Belgrade advocated the joining of these areas with greater Serbia and it is still controlling these local Serbs, who are no longer united, but it is still using them as an instrument of its policy.

Therefore, I think that we have reached a situation whereby these areas will gradually be incorporated into the constituional and legal order of Croatia under the pressure of their position in general and the balance of military forces and everything that results from the political isolation and economic collapse of Serbia and efforts by the international community to create conditions for peace and the restoration of international order.

[Correspondent] Let us return to Bosnia, Mr. president. Back in July this year you said in Geneva ahead of the conclusion of one of many agreements on Bosnia-Herzegovina that the side that did not honor the agreement would be exposed to pressure by the international community. This was a period when Bosnia-Herzegovina was proclaimed a union of republics. However, the war continues. What has happened to the pressure? Was there any pressure by the international community at all?

[Tudjman] There has been pressure and there still is. But, as I have just said, the Bosnian problem, the Bosnian crisis, objectively speaking, is very complex, the most complex in the world nowadays because there is no single standpoint in Europe and in the United States. Within Europe different countries have different approaches, there is no pressure that would be effective. It seems to me that in this respect we are following a positive trend in the sense that the European Union has taken over the initiative and is not leaving it only to the cochairmen, to Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, to conduct negotiations on the settlement of the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now the European Union is more united in its approach.

In this context, I believe that we can conclude with every right that after the Geneva conference which was organized by the European Union, and after the Brussels conference, the position of Croatia has strengthened; that international factors have seen for themselves that Croatia's approach really does proceed from the standpoint of searching for objective ways out of the crisis, ways to restore peace.

There has been intensified pressure on Serbia, because it has been intimated on one side that if Serbia accepts a political solution then the sanctions will gradually be suspended; but on the other hand, there have been indications that under certain conditions, if everything that Serbia pledges to do is fulfilled, this could happen [as heard], otherwise the sanctions could even be intensified.

But, I would say that, apart from such an approach to the pressure on Serbia, it is even more important that Europe and the world have finally understood that Muslims are no longer only victims of Serbian aggression, which has actually been completed—and they are hardly fighting each other any more—but that the Muslims have turned against the Croats, and that the Muslims are now those who are carrying out aggressive operations, even threatening physical survival, perpetrating what the Serbs used to perpetrate—ethnic cleansing of Muslim population. Now the Muslim extremists are perpetrating the same against the Croatian population in central Bosnia: the Muslim are on the offensive against areas of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, planning and aspiring to gain access to the sea, to divide Croatia, in which the Muslim plans to seize not only Neum, but also areas east of Metkovic, which coincides with Serbian imperialistic plans.

At the conferences that I have mentioned, but also in the developments following the signing of the Christmas truce—with the Muslims continuing these offensives—the world understood that it is now Muslims who can no longer be identified as victims, and that a hypocritical policy, I dare say, which allowed the Serbian aggression—and the excuse that the Croats also bore responsibility for the alleged disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina—can no longer be justified and be hidden behind unrealistic assessments by some powers. Therefore, I maintain that we can expect the world to exert more effective pressure on the Muslim leadership.

As far as I know, Willy Claes, president of the Council of Europe, has sent letters not only to Karadzic but also to Izetbegovic, asking them to observe the European Union's demands on ending the war. I can also say that we have achieved, at the highest level, full convergence of views regarding the Bosnian crisis with the Turkish Government. Representatives of the Islamic world as Turkey, and not only Turkey, are dissatisfied with the behavior of the Bosnian Muslim leaders who are continuing hostilities against the Croats.

For this reason, it is to be expected that such pressure, on both sides—on the Serb side which is trying to keep as much of the occupied territory, and on the Muslim side which is trying to take from the Croats what it cannot from the Serbs—will be more effective and that it will eventually bring an end to the war.

[Correspondent] Today we are giving peace a chance and saying: Enough, enough of blood and tears. These were the words of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, when he extended his hand to Yasir 'Arafat. This was seen in the world as the absolute event of the year, the greatest

sensation. But a sensation does not last very long unless it is very soon followed by concrete steps. Is such a sensation to be expected in our areas? Do we have a Yasir 'Arafat?

[Tudjman] You see, we do not have a Yasir 'Arafat in the Croatian territories occupied by Serbian units. As you know the Serbian ringleaders bicker mutually to the point of isolation. They cannot agree over the elections or after the elections, from Knin to Baranja. There is no serious man there with whom we can discuss the political resolution of the problem. Therefore, regarding our Croatian areas under Serbian occupation—'Arafat is in Belgrade. And for this reason we have conducted the kind of talks that we did, within the conference, not only of our own volition but also initiated by the cochairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia and Bosnia, who, in agreement with the most influential European and world states, invite to the talks those who are most responsible for the situation and who should bring peace.

[Correspondent] You mentioned numerous meetings, conferences, talks. How should the proposals and the things that have been agreed be put into practice?

[Tudjman] Clearly, the first problem is that Europe should reach an internal agreement on what it really wants. The contradictions within Europe, to do with attempts to secure spheres of interest in the former Yugoslavia—the former Yugoslavia was created after World War I because of some spheres of interest of the western forces, France and England on one side, Germany on the other, and also the then Soviet Union. Today, again, there is not enough unity in Europe although we must not fail to notice a significant change. For the first time, [French Foreign Minister Alain] Juppe and [German Foreign Minister Klaus] Kinkel's proposal has presented a more unified European view of the crisis. Certain proposals indicate that the viewpoint is gaining ground in Europe that everything possible should be done to bring an end to the war.

It should also be noted that there is still no necessary unity between Europe and—if we say the United Nations, that is really only a formal description, we should be saying the United States to be completely clear. But there are still joint efforts to bring an end to the war that are not only posing a threat to peace and preventing international order from being established but also creating a danger of conflicts between different civilizations in the area.

With regard to the involvement of the Islamic mojahedin volunteers on the Muslim side and the volunteers from the former Soviet Union and today's Russia from the old Bolshevik or radical Orthodox ranks, if the war is not halted there is a threat of a civilizational conflict. For this reason, the international community has shown increasing appreciation of Croatia's constructive policy which, while not abandoning the real, essential interests of the Croatian people and state, is still making a contribution to the international community's efforts to achieve peace and create preconditions for establishing international order in this part of Europe, on the territory where the former Yugoslavia disintegrated.

It is clear that those forces in international politics which have a decisive influence over the creation of international order believe that the future international order in this area can be built with Croatia and with Serbia, and of course with the other states that have been created. But nobody really counts on the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina any more. And this situation was not created by Croatian policy. As I have said, we supported the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as one state but it was clear to us that Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be preserved as a single, unitary state. Proposals for a confederal organization have not, to this very date, been accepted by the Muslims. This reveals to Europe and to the world their simplistic approaches to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

All in all, from this very complicated situation and horrible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina we have finally reached a stage in which there are no unknown factors. Consequently, the international community will have to take steps without any illusion that it should, for example, please the Muslims, as some have advocated at all costs—not just because of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina but because of the influence of the Islamic states in the world. At the same time, while discovering the present Muslim position, the international community has not disregarded the fact—and neither have we ever—that Serbia was the one which caused the war with its aggression. One of the greatest successes of our policy lies in our succeeding—on the basis of Resolution 871 and at every single meeting and at the international conference—in drawing attention to the fact that the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be linked with Serbian aggression in the occupied areas, now UN Protected Areas [UNPA].

Regardless of our primary interest in resolving the UNPA issue, objectively this problem is linked with Bosnia-Herzegovina and we cannot resolve it on our own, without help from the international community. However, our success lies in arousing the desire of the international community to put pressure on Serbia to end its aggression and to accept a solution which is acceptable to other nation. Thus, we have succeeded in linking the sanctions—the only means which have an effect on Serbia—with a solution not only for Bosnia, but also for Croatia.

[Correspondent] We come across the international community at negotiating tables. You mentioned constructiveness. You are now a statesman with considerable negotiating experience. What are the other important factors in negotiations? Resolve, inflexibility, support of the international community? What about interests?

[Tudjman] Indeed, interests guide both individuals and nations. I could give you many examples of world

politicians who said that there were no friends, allies, or enemies for eternity, but it is interests which direct and influence our behavior.

One should recall that the Scandinavian countries—Scandinavia is today an example of democracy and international and interstate relations—that they were at loggerheads until as recently as the beginning of this century. They even waged wars against each other in earlier centuries. One should recall that in Europe the two largest nations, Germany and France, waged a great deal of war against each other in this century, as well as in the last century, whereas today they are the mainstay of a European union, an alliance.

Consequently, I believe that the former Yugoslavia—which collapsed because it was an artificial creation, that it was composed of nations which did not only have different national identities, but which also belonged to different civilizations—that Yugoslavia disintegrated in a period when its disintegration was imminent, during the collapse of Communist socialism and multinational countries in Europe.

It was not only Yugoslavia that disintegrated, it was also the democratic Czech and Slovak Republic and the Soviet Union. Almost all multinational creations disintegrated during the collapse of Communist socialism. Therefore, Bosnia-Herzegovina was also unable to avoid such a destiny in that historical period, even if other individual policies in many aspects had been pursued. Consequently, it is expectable—and I have to say that I could recall having predicted even 20 years ago that a united Europe of nations would be created, a Europe in which small nations would find their solution, their sovereignty, their independence.

The Yugoslav idea originated on Croatian soil. The idea was based on the premise that Croatia could have hegemony, that it could be the leader of the Yugoslav community because of its more advanced culture, because of its higher civilizational level. On the other side, the Serbian side, were the people who understood the Yugoslav idea as merely a greater Serbia. And to this very day they have done everything possible to create a greater Serbia out of Yugoslavia, that is why Yugoslavia has disintegrated. And now they are trying to occupy the Croatian areas which have never been a constituent part of Serbia.

But it has been shown in practice that they cannot achieve this, both because of the balance of forces between Serbia and Croatia and because the international community will not allow it. Therefore, I anticipate that the war will end, relations will be normalized, and a certain Scandinavization will take place as a precondition for establishing international order in this part of Europe, because the warring parties themselves cannot permanently remain at war and the world cannot allow it either.

[Correspondent] What is the price of this? What is the price of peace?

[Tudjman] Even the greatest price paid for peace is lower than the cheapest war—war in the sense of human casualties, material destruction, and the deepening of hatred. Every nation has at some stage understandably achieved peace through the defeat of one side, and of course with the understanding that conditions must be created to sustain peace, to make coexistence possible, if not as friends then as tolerant neighbors. It seems to me that this region is now witnessing the final act of one such perception.

[Correspondent] What should really happen for Croatia to accept a change to its borders or for an exchange of territories? Could this happen in order to achieve peace?

[Tudjman] Regarding Croatian borders, on more than one occasion I told all European, world, and U.S. diplomats and statesmen who asked me if we could perhaps compromise that Croatia cannot make any territorial concessions because Croatia entered the former Yugoslav community with much more territory than the territory within the Croatian borders in federal Yugoslavia and also more than the territory of Croatia within its current internationally recognized borders. Therefore, there is no reason why Croatia should make any territorial concessions.

Apart from this, regarding the demands made by Belgrade that the Serbs in Croatia should have the right to self-determination, I have told them and others in the world that according to international law and according to the real situation in the world it is nations and not national minorities that have the right to self- determination and to their own states. The Serbs were a national minority in Croatia, formed in the 16th century. Let us not go into that now. While the Yugo-communist army was here, that minority amounted to as much as 12 percent. After the army's departure this fell by further 2 or 3 percent, and then fell again because of the war.

Therefore, there is no reason why Serbia should fail to understand that the Serbs in Croatia can and must enjoy things and that Croatia is ready to grant them all civil and ethnic rights, but they cannot enjoy the position of the herren-volk, of the ruling nation in Croatia. The problem not only of Albanians in Kosovo, but also of the Hungarians and Croats in Serbia, is even greater than the problem of the Serbs in Croatia. That issue cannot be analyzed as an isolated issue, but Serbia must understand that peace can be achieved on the basis of mutual recognition in the existing borders, not only on the basis of reciprocity but also on the basis of international conventions on national minority rights.

You mentioned concessions. There is still the problem of what kind of demarcation. As things stand now the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be solved. A union of republics is no longer mentioned as a solution because, well, we favored a union, we signed an agreement with Izetbegovic, I personally signed it, under which the Muslim and Croatian republic within the union would develop ever closer relations and friendship with each other and

with Croatia. However, two days later Izetbegovic signed an agreement with the Serbs, thus practically agreeing on the seperation of the republics, on the disintegration of the union, but with the Muslim state inheriting the right to UN membership and other international rights enjoyed by Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Muslim leadership is now categorically demanding to have Neum, to such an extent that the international community has now demanded that Croatia secure access to the sea for the future Bosnian Muslim republic. The Muslims are demanding territorial sovereignty. When I categorically refused this and said that under no circumstances could we agree to Neum becoming part of the Muslim republic, i.e. that part of the Croatian national territory be divided, with the separation of the southern-most part and of Dubrovnik—and in this respect the Muslim demand coincides with the imperialistic and aggressive Serbian policy since the last century. [sentence as heard] In this war, too, they wanted to take Dubrovnik. We cannot agree to that. An idea was thus born in Europe and among the Muslims that we would give them access to the sea at Prevlaka and in return Neum would immediately go to Croatia, i.e. that Croatia would get the Dubrovnik hinterland in return, which would be more than compensation for Croatia, according to some international circles.

In our quest for peace, as I have said, we can also take such a solution into consideration, as we have offered the Muslims a free zone in Ploce and the possibility of building a port on the Neretva River as their access to the sea. We have offered them a free zone in Rijeka, having in mind western Bosnia—Bihac and Cazin Krajina. We have also taken into consideration the issue of granting them access to the sea in the area of Prevlaka.

I have told the most responsible people in Europe and the United States that we are willing to consider every suggestion which is in the interest of peace without being damaging to Croatia, i.e. which is beneficial to Croatia. I have also pointed out, though, that at the same time, the problem of Prevlaka is a rather wider problem since the promontory of Ostri Vrh, the tip of Prevlaka, controls access to Boka Kotorska. Hence, it might represent a strategic interest, not merely a Croatian, Serbian, or Muslim interest, within wider developments given the fact that Russia—regardless of whether it is ruled by Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, Stalin, or Yeltsin today, or someone like Zhirinovsky tomorrow—such as it is, will always remain a Eurasian power and it will always aspire to gaining access to the Mediterranean.

This problem is thus linked to Croatia's interest to protect Dubrovnik and its integrity and to make the territory of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna as compact as possible so we can achieve peace as well as the most compact territory in order to strategically secure Croatia's borders. Consequently, we approach this issue with a great deal of tact. We are willing to consider it from the point of view of Croatian historic and strategic interests and to reach agreement with our allies, with our friends in the world, not just from today's point of view but from the point of view of potential relations in the future.

[Correspondent] Mr president, when do you think the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] will leave Croatia?

[Tudjman] The moment we reach a political solution on the integration of these Croatian areas in the constitutional system of Croatia by peaceful means or—if we are forced, i.e. if Serbs [words indistinct]—by military means. But I hope we are on the road to signing a general cease-fire agreement and the end of hostilities and on gradual integration by way of opening up roads, railways, power lines, gas pipelines, etc, which is not only in the interest of Croatia but also in the interest of the currently occupied areas, of Serbia, and of all neighboring countries which means Europe as well.

[Correspondent] Last year was a year for reexamining almost all international organizations, above all with regard to the settlement of the Balkan crisis, to the United Nations and NATO. In September, at the opening of the UN General Assembly [UNGA] session, you warned of the power of national interests in the UN Security Council [UNSC] whenever major decisions were being made. Has anything changed since?

[Tudjman] I do not think so. All the major components, [word indistinct], of this policy have remained the same. National interests, you see, there is a political periscope, a problem of approach to national interests and the national issue and also in practice [sentence as heard].

Namely, the western world, both Europe and the United States, often approach the national problem in a one-sided way. They understand that the disintegration of both socialism and multinational countries has even led to national expansionism, but they forget that national democratic movements were the main force in toppling the Stalinist-type communism, and that the creation of national states which is now taking place is the process which in Western Europe and Scandinavia took place in the last century or at the turn of the century.

Therefore, the creation and national interests themselves and the efforts to secure national interests are not negative by nature. They become negative at the moment a nation starts pursuing an expansionist program, as is the case in Serbia with the program for the creation of greater Serbia. However, the settlement of interethnic relations and protection of national interests is a precondition for the creation of a normal and stable international order.

[Correspondent] Of course, this was all about decision-making in the UNGA and the functioning of the entire system of the UN, i.e. the peace forces. It is a fact that in almost all hotbeds of crisis in the world the peacekeeping forces are in some way experiencing the same fate. The message coming from those whom the UN is supposed to

protect is: Go home. Is the main role of the UN understated or is this protection of peace being carried out incorrectly?

[Tudjman] You see, we must be realistic in this respect. The crisis on former Yugoslav soil, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is one of the most overt, exacerbated, and convoluted ones, but it is not the only one. There are such crises elsewhere in the world: if not 20 there are at least 10 of them. Therefore, the United Nations is frustrated in many ways: first, there is no effective international instrument which could be used to impose UN Security Council [UNSC] resolutions. There is no effective international instrument that could be used to impose UNSC Resolution decisions. Our people are rightly embittered about UNPROFOR—rightly so and for the most part—because UNPROFOR failed to accomplish its mission. However, the agreement on the involvement of UNPROFOR was based on the sides in conflict, i.e. both Croatia and Serbia, accepting a political solution and disarming the Serbian paramilitary units, while Croatia was to ensure political rights for the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia. The Serbs rejected this and UNPROFOR, with the mandate it received from the UNSC and the forces and equipment it had at its disposal, was not set a task of imposing the Vance-Owen plan by force. Consequently, the demand [for UNPROFOR] to go home is justified. However, one tends to forget the fact that the Serbs, i.e. Belgrade, were responsible for UNPROFOR's failure to carry out its duties, as Belgrade put up a resistance to UNPA being integrated into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia and is still maintaining the idea that these areas could one day be included in some kind of a federation of Serbian states, i.e. a greater Serbia.

[Correspondent] The UN on its own cannot impose peace, but there is another organization which can do that—NATO. Its function is to protect safety in Europe. What is the role of NATO generally if its activity boils down to verbal duels and warnings that peace is necessary for the stable development of Europe?

[Tudjman] Our people are rightly embittered about UNPROFOR. Rightly so for the most part because UNPROFOR failed to accomplish its mission. However, the agreement on the involvement of UNPROFOR was based on the sides in conflict, both Croatia and Serbia, accepting a political solution and disarming the Serbian paramilitary units, while Croatia was to ensure political rights for the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia. The Serbs rejected this and UNPROFOR, with the mandate it received from the UNSC and the forces and equipment it had at its disposal, was not set the task of forcefully imposing the Vance-Owen plan. Consequently, the demand for UNPROFOR to go home is justified, but one tends to forget the fact that the Serbs, Belgrade, were responsible for UNPROFOR's failure to carry out its duties, as Belgrade put up resistance to UNPA being integrated into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia, and is still maintaining the idea that these areas could one day be included in some kind of a federation of Serbian states —a greater Serbia.

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[Tudjman] Well, we must again bear in mind that NATO came into being at the time when on the other side constituted the Warsaw Pact, in other words, the bipolar division of the world, and that under its internal principles NATO is not expected to intervene outside the NATO countries. This is one point.

We are faced with a lack of unity in Europe and in the United States. Until unity is achieved as to what they want and who decides there can be no NATO involvement.

I have proposed to European and U.S. factors, both at conferences and in written form, the involvement of NATO because this is an efficient organization from the technical point of view and with its own leadership. I even said that I thought if NATO were to get involved we would not need any more forces than the UNPROFOR has at present. UNPROFOR is disorganized. Both in Croatia and Bosnia we have units from Canada, Kenya, Ukraine, Russia, France, and England. All these forces are not adequately equipped technically, there is not enough unity among them and, understandably, their approach is different. If NATO were to become organized as a forceful military organization, then this would have a psychological impact on the warring parties and, contrary to what is happening today, would force them to adhere to what they have agreed upon.

For NATO involvement to be possible Europe and the United States should know what they want to achieve politically. An armed intervention can only be effective if its goal is well-defined.

[Correspondent] There were times when it was known that decisions on the issues of war and peace were made in either Washington or Moscow. Where are these decisions being made today?

[Tudjman] The problem is in the fact that today the European Union or alliance is coming into existence, but it is obvious that within it there are different views coming from Paris, London, and Bonn. The issue is who in the Union will have the upper hand, both when it comes to the state and, obviously...[pauses] I was told by one, and not just one state president but by many others, that Europe today should be more united about having a more decisive leadership, and that the world is in a state of turmoil without a more determined leadership, without a vision of what the new world order should be after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. There is anxiety in the world over the fact that about dozen states still possess nucelar weapons, and there is a need for a

balance of powers and that the main world powers are trying to secure their own spheres of influence—the world is as it has been since time immemorial. We must not delude ourselves by thinking that it will be easy to establish a new world order.

[Correspondent] What is the main threat to peace in the world at present?

[Tudjman] The hotbeds of crisis in the world and, as far as we are concerned, the ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in UNPAs. However, in this regard I think that in our conversation today I mentioned the fact that there is a serious danger of a conflict between civilizations. This is what is worrying, especially regarding the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But precisely for that reason, as a conflict between civilizations could bring into question human civilization itself, it is realistic to expect that reason will prevail in the world, and that they would gather around a program by which a new world order would be restored on this disarray that we are witnessing, so that a world catastrophe could be avoided.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, we have many more questions for you, but questions from our viewers are pouring in. We have to reply to them. I think that our viewers' questions are the most important. Let us reply to questions that have been asked. Please be brief and to the point as people lay great store by it. A viewer from Zagreb: Why doesn't the president—that means you—tell Izetbegovic that, if he [Izetbegovic] does not stop the offensive against Croats in Bosnia we will send all Muslim refugees in Croatia back to Bosnia?

[Tudjman] Because the world would then say that we are acting in an inhumane fashion. If the war were to continue, of course we would be forced to take such decisive steps, but we are first trying all we can together with these people [Muslims] to end the war and reach a political solution.

[Correspondent] Branko Vrbanc from Zagreb: Mr. President, thanks to you the Croats in Croatia and worldwide have united as never before. Now that we have achieved sovereignty and foreign acclaim, some opposition party leaders are trying to break up that unity by all means. I do not think any democratic state would allow any such agitators who make public statements to go unpunished. What can you do to prevent that?

[Tudjman] I think the Croatian people is politically mature, it has accomplished the creation of its own state, and it can be proud that in Croatia we have established a more stable democratic order than in any other former communist country. Therefore, the opposition—and not only the opposition, as there are opposition parties with serious political approaches, but there have been some anarchic phenomena particularly in journalism, which requires other measures; however, Croatia's democratic order is sufficiently strong to resist all that. With this crisis our policy will be even better affirmed before our people and the world as the correct one, and therefore opposing views will not be threatening.

[Correspondent] Another viewer would like to know how long will we have to delude ourselves that the world and Europe will resolve the UNPA issue?

[Tudjman] Not for one moment did I have any illusion that the world would solve our problems for us, but we have had to coordinate efforts to resolve the problems with our forces with international factors—and that remains to be our problem—because we do not live in a vacuum, but in the world such as it is.

[Correspondent] How does Mr. President intend to achieve an integral Croatia by pursuing such a peace-loving policy when, in the daily news today, we heard a statement by [Bosnian Serb assembly chairman] Momcilo Krajisnik that the Bosnian republic of Srpska and occupied territories in Croatia, the so-called Krajina, that they would join their mother country, Serbia, by next year.

[Tudjman] I intend to resolve the Krajina problem by political means, but I have said—if necessary—by military means. However, if Momcilo Krajisnik keeps repeating such statements on the unification of Serbian republics—as he said it, or whatever he said—we should tell him that for the first time lately, after the Geneva and Brussels conferences, Serbian President Milosevic himself said that we should work on the normalization of relations and the gradual settlement of the UNPA problem by opening up roads and other problems.

Serbian Foreign Minister Jovanovic has also recently stated that problems ought to be resolved in that sense. In opposition to such statements as those made by Krajisnik, there are those which are much more authoritative, showing that it is necessary to reach a political solution within Croatia.

[Correspondent] Does urging a peaceful resolution of the crisis in occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia come as a result of Croatia's military inferiority as it has recently been said in foreign press commentaries?

[Tudjman] No, it is certain that in the beginning, in 1990 and 1991, we were militarily inferior, because we had the entire Yugoslav Army against us—Serbia and Montenegro. We were militarily inferior then, but not today, in relation to Serbian forces between Knin and Baranja.

However, it is also certain that if we were forced to seek a military solution then we would suffer casualties and further destruction, and that would delay our economic development, and so on. Therefore, it is in Croatia's interest, and also because of coordination with the world, and even with those in the world who are Croatia's honest friends—we also have those. Therefore, we should try to do everything to find a politically based resolution. We did not forget for a moment that we would not tolerate such a situation contravening Croatia's interests, and that we would, should it become obvious that a political solution is not possible, that, with the armed forces we have created, with the unity of the Croatian people, and not just of the refugees but also

with the unity of the entire Croatian people, that we would most certainly take measures to liberate every inch of Croatian soil.

[Correspondent] Jure Madjar from Sisak asks: Is there an example in history whereby someone waged a war of conquest and then returned occupied territories following negotiations.

[Tudjman] There are. When they were forced to do so.

[Correspondent] A refugee from Vukovar: What is the Croatian Government intending to do regarding the missing defenders of Vukovar?

[Tudjman] We have been doing everything possible. According to details at hand, 6,800 people have been registered as killed. A year ago we still had around 13,500 missing people. That list of missing people has gradually decreased and today there are 7,000 people on the list of missing people. We have exchanged hundreds of POW's with Serbia. We reached an agreement to exchange those about which we know, for instance the Croatian group held in Sombor—they are demanding the Karlovac group—and on this we reached an agreement. This was all worked on previously by Vice Premier Mate Granic; now it is worked on by Vice Premier Kostovic.

In the course of my talks with Milosevic, this was one of the reasons behind these talks—to solve this question as well. He said in the presence of witnesses that he was ready, that they would release those who are being held in their prisons so we would release prisoners here. He claimed that in Serbia there are no others.

Consequently, we are working on the final resolution of the problem of Vukovar and not only Vukovar but that of all those other people who are still registered as missing. Unfortunately, we must be certain that most of those who we still regard as missing are probably dead or have been exposed to a massacre, terror, and death. This is one of the reasons that I have always pointed out that I will do everything to avoid paying for Croatian freedom, Croatian sovereignty with more casualties unless they are necessary.

At the same time I am aware—I have said this too—that no people have ever in their history acquired freedom without casualties. No people have had their freedom served on a plate. I am therefore aware that if need be one should be resolute enough to wage a holy war for the homeland. Before this we will indeed do everything so our policies aided by the international community reach the final goal in a peaceful way without further casualties.

[Correspondent] Croatian police and judicial authorities held war criminals Hadzic [Goran Hadzic, former Krajina president], Arkan [Zeljko Raznjatovic, Serbian paramilitary leader] and others?

[Tudjman] Well, from this point of view that act is unjustifiable. However, one should remember that not only the Serbs in Croatia and Serbia but also the international public are blaming the Croatian authorities for not having a correct attitude toward the Serbs, implying that they were forced to rebel and fight for secession because of our terror. It is clear that this is not true. After we established our democratic government I was the one who initiated talks with the most radical Serbs—with the late Professor Raskovic. The Serbs at that time did not accept the communists, the Serbian communists in our parliament as their representatives. Therefore, we wanted a political solution. Our policy was to talk to all Serbs, even the radical ones, in order to find a political solution.

I was not informed that Arkan and Hadzic would be released. On one hand individuals decided in Hadzic's case because he was held by the police while Arkan was brought to court and the court let him go. The court did not consult the Croatian authorities and it made an independent decision. This is an example of how the judicial authorities should be independent in reaching their verdict, but this decision also must be in accordance with the state policy. Arkan was known for his terrorist actions even in former Yugoslavia.

This is my reply to your question. On one hand there was a political effort to create preconditions for normal life with the Serbs in Croatia by avoiding cases like these. On the other hand as you can see a wrong decision was made by the judicial authorities as they independently made their decisions.

[Correspondent] Were you, in the capacity of the president of the state, informed about a newspaper report on alleged crimes perpetrated in the course of 1991? Further, how is it possible that a document, whose existence Minister Jarnjak confirmed in his assembly address saying that it was a state secret, has leaked into the public?

[Tudjman] I was not informed about it. I first read about it on Christmas, on 25 December, and I wrote about it—actually after it was published.

This report was submitted to the office for the protection of constitutional order, which was then chaired by Josip Manolic. It did not reach me, but we had clear....[pauses] Both the government was tasked and the council of defence and national security examined that issue and said—not only said, but gave the following guidelines, orders to all competent bodies of state administration—every crime, every robbery should relentlessly be not only curbed and prevented, but the perpetrators should also be called to account and punished accordingly.

We also said that neither can we tolerate vengeful actions by people in the course of combat. Therefore, what the report says should have been prevented, and people should have been called to account. Why and how it happened that the report was published is a task for the state prosecutor and our national security service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to find out. This was either

lack of responsibility in dealing with state documents or even an attempt to compromise our democratic authorities and the leadership.

These are things that we cannot tolerate. I am particularly interested in not only why and how the report was published, but also what happened to all those people who are listed in the report as having perpetrated criminal acts. Therefore, I have set a task to examine all this, and I am pleased that the Assembly has begun discussing these issues, and hence the public and the Croatian Assembly can be informed about it.

[Correspondent] Why doesn't Croatia insist on a deadline in connection with the implementation of Resolution 871?

[Tudjman] We certainly wanted and sought this, but we are faced here with an international situation and international factors that are making a connection between the resolution of the UNPA zones in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. And our demand could only be as it is—i.e., we are seeking a departure, and after this we will take responsibility for the renewal of the war or its expansion. Here—as we have been told not only by those international factors who do not go along with us but also by our friends—we would be exposed to the renewal of the war and also to international sanctions. [as heard] So we did not want to get ourselves into a situation in which (?Serbia)....[sentence incomplete as heard]

[Correspondent] (Pane Brtic) from Pula asks: Some say that the building of the tunnel through Cicarija and the tunnels through Velebit and Maslenica bridge are white elephants, or were these merely election promises? If not, when will these projects be finished?

[Tudjman] They will be completed in a year or so. I think that at that time we said, did we not, that the work had begun and would be continued, and it is quite clear that both through Velebit [as heard] and the tunnel through Ucka are of vital interest not only in terms of linking Istria with Croatia in a political sense—a national-political sense—but also in an economic sense.

I will tell you now what you may not know—neither does our public know: Croatian politicians from Istria—such as Ante Mandic, who was one of the members of the Yugoslav Committee and who was in favor of unification of all south-Slavonic countries, for the creation of Yugoslavia, and who was also a participant of the anti-fascist war—immediately after the war he proposed to Tito, after Istria had joined its Croatian homeland, that a tunnel be made. Tito agreed with Mandic that this should be done, but Croatian and Yugoslav political circles turned a deaf ear to it, saying that this would be too expensive. Later only a road tunnel was made, while the rail tunnel was left to...[pauses] Not only railway line, but it was also the airport in Pula that was organized by the Slovenes. Therefore, it is natural that with the establishment of an independent Croatia we should adopt a decision that we would also build a rail tunnel, in order to realize the idea which the revivalists in Istria advocated back in the last century, and which as I have said was mentioned as a necessity for Istria, for Croatia, even by such people as I have mentioned, despite all those aspirations toward Istria.

[Correspondent] After Istria, someone from Slavonski Brod. A viewer from Slavonski Brod has put this question: Is Croatia going to help the Croats in central Bosnia before it is too late?

[Tudjman] Croatia has been doing everything to help the Croats. Primarily we wanted to help them in the way of having friendly relations with the Muslim leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We said that the survival of the Croats living in Vares, Kakanj, and Zepce is a guarantee that the Muslims will likewise enjoy the same rights in those areas that were envisaged to be Croat provinces, which is now the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. Therefore, we wanted to secure their future in a political way, but on the other hand we aided them in their defense, first from the Serbian aggression, then from the Muslim one as much as we could.

We will do so in the future as well. Not only in those areas that I have mentioned, but also in the entire area that the Muslims are now trying to occupy: Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, Kresevo, Kiseljak, and so on. Therefore, not only through direct negotiations, talks with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic, but also through the involvement of those international factors that are interested in restoring peace and friendship between the Muslims and Croatia as soon as possible, such as Turkey, Austria, Germany; I even invited European Council President Claes to attend our meeting with Izetbegovic in Vienna in order that we could achieve all that. Unfortunately not very successfully so far, but most certainly we are not going to give up the protection of the Croat people in Bosnia for a single moment or the protection of the strategic interests of the Croatian state in relation to the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Correspondent] A viewer from Sisak asks whether there has been a change in Croatia's official policy in respect to the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, having in mind some confusing statements by high-ranking Croatian officials.

[Tudjman] No, there has been no change because there is no need for it. We have conducted a consistent policy: If it is possible to preserve Bosnia as a whole, independent state, that is possible only on a confederal basis. But if there is a split-up as Izetbegovic agreed with the Serbs, it is normal that—if Izetbegovic agreed for the republic of Srpska in Bosnia to join Serbia—the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna should join Croatia, while the position of the Croat population remaining in other republics should be safeguarded on the basis of reciprocity and with international guarantees.

[Correspondent] Ana Vulic from Split asks if you are aware that Alija Izetbegovic signed a secret agreement

with the Serbs on the day he was held in captivity. Should we not ban him from entering Croatia?

[Tudjman] Croatia has a strategic interest in maintaining friendly relations with the Muslims in order to keep as large a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible, out of the reach of Croatia's main enemy. The West is also interested in this. You are aware of the differences between eastern and western Europe; since the breakup of the Roman Empire and Christianity. We had a situation in which the Serbs were so numerous in Bosnia-Herzegovina that they could impose their republic and secession. The West did not prevent this, they did not prevent the Serbian aggression. Why? It could even be that they wanted to prevent the creation of an Islamic state in Europe. At the same time, many factors would like to make the Bosnian Muslims accept Western Civilization through cooperation with Croatia. In that sense Croatia and the western world have common interests, and that is why we are doing everything we can to end hostilities between Croats and Muslims, to create normal relations in the interest of Croatia and the West, which above all takes care of its own interests and its relations with Islamic states.

As you know there are 51 Islamic states in the United Nations and they possess not only oil, but they also have capital in many European states and throughout the world. This is why we cannot look at this as relations between the Croats and the Muslims alone. Of course this aspect is the most important one but we also have to coordinate our interests with the most important international factors.

[Correspondent] Let us return to the international negotiations. Milan from Zagreb asks why do you not make your presence at negotiations on Bosnia conditional on the withdrawal of Serb forces from Croatia and is it not naive to negotiate with the Muslims about their access to the sea?

[Tudjman] Who can say that I have not demanded this from the Serbs [Tudjman laughs] and who could imagine that we have been naive even for a moment. If we had been naive we would not have achieved our independent and internationally recognized Croatia despite all opposition. Our people can trust us and we can make our state even stronger based on our achievements.

[Correspondent] A viewer from Split: After the fall of Bugojno [Bosnian town disputed by the Croats and the Muslims, currently held by the Muslims] Muslim refugees [in Croatia] celebrated this event in Hotel Neptun in Tucepi [Croatian resort on the Dalmatian coast]. Of course, this caused a clash with Croat refugees and local people. Hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees are in Croatia today and at the same time their sons, husbands, and brothers are attacking Croats in central Bosnia. It seems that in this way Croatia is indirectly helping the aggression against the [Bosnian] Croats.

[Tudjman] Yes, this is a paradox. I spoke about this on many occasions with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic. I spoke about it at the European conference on Bosnia. I said that it costs us dearly; this situation in which we provide shelter for Muslims here [in Croatia], we provide education for their children while at the same time Croats are being killed there [in central Bosnia]. I explained that this cannot be tolerated and that we can hardly control the justified anger of the Croatian people. Unfortunately even these arguments failed to persuade the Muslim leadership to end the aggression. They accepted the Christmas truce; but they continued the aggression. They also attacked the White Path humanitarian convoy. However this convoy, led by Slobodan Lang, helped to make the world see, even those people who do not support us, I mean that part of the world which now wants to lift the sanctions against Serbia, to shift the responsibility for the situation in Bosnia on Croatia too [as received]. With the example of the White Path convoy [Croatian aid for central Bosnia, attacked by Muslims] the world realized what is it all about: that the Muslims are truly using violent means, that they did not allow doctors to enter Nova Bila, and that the doctors came under attack. This showed that the Muslims are now carrying out a genocide against Croats.

All this has created a situation where either the Muslims will abandon this policy or the world will have to understand the steps that we will have to take to defend the Croatian people there [in Bosnia] and for possible steps that we will have to take in relation to the Muslim refugees in Croatia.

[Correspondent] Is Islamic fundamentalism at work in Bosnia, a viewer from Pula asks.

[Tudjman] Of course, to a certain extent it is. You can find mojahedin there, from various Islamic countries and from Sandzak [Muslim populated area in Yugoslavia]. We have also received alarming reports about efforts to establish an Islamic state, about songs being sung such as: From Istanbul to Trieste There Will Not Be Any Christians. It is also worrying that this Muslim [Izetbegovic] leadership has begun a war against those Muslims who really support friendly relations with Croatia. Many Muslims feel like this; it is not just Fikret Abdic in Western Bosnia or Cazin Krajina. Hadziosmanovic, Pohara [Muslim leaders loyal to Fikret Abdic], Zulfo Robovic, who is a member of the [Herceg-Bosna] government, and others also belong to this group. Many Muslims are like this but they do not have the kind of influence on Bosnian politics that Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, Ganic, and others have.

[Correspondent] A viewer from Zagreb asks where the Muslims got their weapons.

[Tudjman] The Muslims partly control military factories in Bosnia. Above all, we also gave them weapons at the beginning when we fought jointly against the Serb aggressor; we also gave them weapons. They also armed themselves by using humanitarian convoys [to smuggle weapons]. We have also received reports that they have been giving large sums of money, as they say fat wads of

dollars, to buy weapons from the Serbs. They even rent [Serb] tanks to use them against the Croats. So this is a chaotic situation in which not only common interests and contradictions are intertwined but also in certain areas local commanders are creating various and sometimes even hellish situations.

[Correspondent] We have quite a few questions from our viewers which are identical to those that we were planning to ask. For instance, a Zlatko from Zagreb is asking you, and this is what I was planning to ask you, whether Croatia is planning to further the process of privatization. This is also linked to the fact that we have all noticed that the influx of foreign capital into Croatia has been insufficient. Can some changes to the process of privatization be expected in this regard?

[Tudjman] The problem of privatization in all former socialist countries is a very complex problem. However, Croatia has made a huge step also in that respect. Today we have got around 79,000 private enterprises. With reference to foreign investments last year and this year: last year there were 2,187 foreign investments and opening of foreign enterprises, I think. This year some more 1,000 to 1,100 independent or mixed enterprises were opened. Last year more than 600,000,000 German Marks was invested either in the form of direct capital or in the form of machinery. This year around $300 million was invested. This means that privatization is going ahead and that despite the war foreign business circles have got trust in Croatia; capital is steadily flowing into Croatia.

Another thing in connection with privatization: private enterprises employing up to 200 workers earn around 35 per cent of the income. That process which is very complex and convoluted is going on, and obviously, once the war situation is over it will undergo a turnabout, gain a momentum; there are foreign studies saying that Croatia will be of the most prosperous countries, particularly in the light of results that the Croatian Government has achieved in slashing inflation, which was met by almost disbelief in the world, and by the most serious financial circles, such as IMF, the World Bank and other business circles: how did we succeed to [slash] this inflation which was inherited in Croatia from former Yugoslavia.

Having taken over the power in spring, in May 1990, we inherited huge inflation which was 45.8 percent—it was 46 percent back in January 1990.

Despite the war and all the plight caused by the war, declining production, destruction of industrial facilities, we succeeded in reducing it. However, this year [1993], right up to September, it nevertheless fluctuated from between 25 and 28 percent. And now Valentic's government and steps we have taken—if you remember in March this year, in my speech in the Assembly, I outlined the program of economic revival and forecast our economic revival and a fall in inflation as precondition for making national currency convertible. The previous government of Prime Minister Sarinic drew up a stabilization program, Valentic's government took it over and took efficient and effective steps which helped us to reduce the inflation from 38 per cent to 1.4 percent in November. During the current month of December the inflation has been slashed, we even have a negative inflation of minus zero percent [as received]. The world is absolutely amazed at this and this has created foundations for implementing our plan for introducing convertible national currency next year on Statehood Day.

Allow me to say in this context that even the most competent international experts, theoreticians and those who apply it in practice, for instance I have an opportunity to talk to such people as deputy in a company such as Ford responsible for the entire Eastern Europe who told me that he had been in all those countries, Poland, the Czech republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Russia, Ukraine, and he told me: I was amazed at how you in Croatia, I thought there was war in Croatia but what I found is the situation better than in any other country except perhaps the Czech Republic. Or in our talks here with Professor Dihibuchi, he is an expert of international reputation who played the most important role in bringing economic stability in Chile, on his mother's side he is a Croat but born there—and he said, what you have done—and not only he, others have also said it—you were able to achieve this because you knew what you wanted, because you had the right leadership. This is possible only in the countries with the majority government and with a leadership that knows what it wants. And where the situation is not like in Croatia—he cited the examples of Poland and others—where there is no such leadership and where coalition governments are in power that argue over what to do—there will be no results in the economic sphere.

In other words, as far as the world is concerned, in this sphere too we succeeded in achieving a miracle. Of course, all problems have not been solved. We are yet to expect a great deal of sweat, of effort in both the process of privatization and in restructuring, in general, and the transformation of the socialist system but we should be more than satisfied with the results achieved so far.

[Correspondent] Does this include the problem of denationalization?

[Tudjman] Absolutely! At one of the meetings of the National Security Council I announced that I personally will ask both the Assembly and the government to begin to tackle the problem of denationalization in a more effective way. In other words, I shall ask them to pass the law on denationalization despite the fact that the experience from other countries shows that this is a very complicated process which cannot be approached in a simplified way. We must not make mistakes that would be greater than the ones we are trying to rectify. We must not jeopardize the current level of production, etc. In other words, this is something that foreign citizens, foreign countries also [?face]. This is a very complex issue but we must approach it primarily by passing

relevant law and in practice by denationalizing wherever possible or by providing relevant compensation.

[Correspondent] A question on internal policy. Some have criticized us for the violation of human rights mentioning the destruction of Serbian houses, eviction of Serbs from their flats. It is sufficient to mention the village of Cicak. Are these only exceptions or is it our big guilt as some people have put it?

[Tudjman] These are neither exceptions nor guilt. These are results and consequences of an aggressive war that was imposed on Croatia. In such a war, which assumed characteristics of a life and death struggle in some areas, obviously despite all our efforts to prevent lawlessness we could not achieve that. This could not be achieved by any country in any war. From the Americans in Vietnam, the French in Algiers, you can see what is happening after the Jews in Israel and Palestinians reached the agreement, what is happening in Northern Island.

As long as the war situation is continuing some anarchic phenomena cannot be avoided. It is completely certain that we have demanded the observance of human rights, no vengeful actions should be allowed, and people should be called to account. It is completely certain that as regards human rights and freedom of media under war conditions we permitted some even anarchic phenomena to take place, which no state, even under more favorable conditions would permit.

There have been such phenomena. We will do everything to eliminate them and those who perpetrated them should be called to account, particularly if some robberies have taken place. However, it is important to say that this happened during the war on the territory of Croatia under the conditions when 300 [figure as heard] Croatian people were not only evicted from their homes but also were forced to watch crimes from Vukovar to Skabrnja; the killing of their relatives, women, children, elderly people; and that this created a situation whereby all our attempts to prevent phenomena that are abnormal have not been effective so far. However, we will do everything on our part for Croatia to be a law-governed state and to prevent such phenomena.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, you probably know that the citizens of Croatia who live in the UNPA zones are watching us. What do you think the people in the media and you people in politics.... [pauses] how should we best establish contact with them?

[Tudjman] I am glad you have asked this question so that I might say to you that really one significant part of this common people from Knin to Baranja has beed deluded. They have been deceived along the lines.... [pauses] Here we have some ustashas who have come to power who have no other task than to kill you. So there are a small number of these Serbian extremists who have been nurtured on [this propaganda] and are doing everything to unify these areas with a greater Serbia.

People who have had negotiations with the Serbs from all these areas—from Knin to western Slavonia and so on—have told me how these people were amazed when they were told that the Serbs were living normally in Zagreb and other areas; what was it that we were offering them? Slavko Degoricija has had a series of talks with these and other people. So this ordinary Serb in Knin is being deluded.

The task for you in radio and television, as well, in a technical sense—we set ourselves such a task—is to establish possibilities for us to be heard so that the truth about Croatia might emerge, [and so that the Serbs might learn] what we are offering them, and that this is in their interest, so that they might find a way out of this [word indistinct] situation and the terror that is being perpetrated by those who are even imprisoning those people who are normal and who want a political solution [sentence as heard].

You should to a greater extent include in your radio and television broadcasts topics on this normalization of relations in Croatia and guide Serbs who know the situation and know what we want sincerely for the sake of Croatia and the Croatian people and Serbs in Croatia and for the sake of the normalization of relations about which I spoke in this conversation when I referred to the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia for the sake of the world and peace and for the sake of international order.

[Correspondent] Experienced diplomats have said that what we do not expect always happens. Precisely for that reason, do heads of state have the right to fear? Are you afraid sometimes?

[Tudjman] No. [long pause] I am a man who steeps himself in living history, who takes part in history, and in creating this history, if I can say so. From my early youth, as a ten-year-old boy I took part in carrying messages during the 6 January dictatorship [dictatorship imposed on 6 January 1929 by Yugoslav King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic] when people were imprisoned and even killed for it. My father introduced me to that.

However, by analyzing history I have come to the conclusion that if someone is a head of state he has to be ready to do what is in the interest of the people. I will give you an example: On 24 January 1991 a session of the then Yugoslav presidency in Belgrade was convened. We were in the [Croatian] Assembly. A vast majority of my closest associates and deputies to the assembly told me not to go, that I would be assassinated. I went, being aware that it was necessary for me to go, regardless of what happened to me. If I had not gone to Belgrade then, the army machinery of the Yugoslav People's Army would have been moved to carry out an all-out attack on Croatia. The Croatian Government would have been toppled. Hence, we would not have had democratic Croatia. So, I was ready and aware what could happen to me, what happened to Radic [Stjepan Radic, a Croatian

deputy, was shot dead in the Yugoslav Assembly in 1928]. However, courage is to do what has to be done in the interest of the people when you are at the head of a people's movement or a state.

[Correspondent] At that time many were against your decision to travel to Belgrade. Now when these talks end, certain documents are signed and certain decisions are made. Many people say you should not have done it that way, you could have done it this way, you could have done it in a better way, and so on. To what extent are you personally affected by criticism?

[Tudjman] Well, you know, human stupidity has never been dear to me [laughs]. Nevertheless, I have confidence both in my own judgement and in the fact that people are following not only my programme but—I can cite a thousand examples of how people from all strata, from ordinary women and schoolchildren to university professors—and they have said to me personally and written to me saying how they spontaneously sensed that what I am implementing is what they, too, want [sentence as heard].

Several days ago a local official visited me and said something along the lines of: I travelled a long way and came home and said to my old mother, you know what, mother, I am now with the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], and then she replied—to cut the story short—Thank God, son, you are not separate from the people [Tudjman laughs].

I think there are in what we have achieved... [pauses] we have achieved a national-democratic rebirth of the Croatian nation and most people, regardless of political differences, live for this freedom and democracy in Croatian that we have created. This gives me the basis for being sure of my actions.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, all of us have some kind of expectations of Croatia. If you want to get something from Croatia you have to give something, too. So you should, therefore, love Croatia. In your opinion what is the best way to love Croatia?

[Tudjman] To do everything you can for Croatia, for your own satisfaction, for your families and for the satisfaction of the people and in the interests of the people.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] a question of a personal nature. What is it like to be head of state?

[Tudjman] Perhaps you will not believe me when I tell you I did not want to be a politician. I wanted to be an academic. I wanted..... [pauses] I have, I think, three or four books, which will be of significance not only in Croatia but also in world literature—from my "Rat Protiv Rata" [War Against War] to "Velike Ideje I Male Narode" [Great Ideas and Small Nations] and "Nacionalno Pitanje u Evropi" [The National Question in Europe], in which I predicted these events, and "Bespuca" [Wasteland]. I have two manuscripts that I would be happier to finish and publish than anything else.

I am probably somewhat to blame for this freedom and sovereignty of Croatia, but personally I am a slave of Croatia—from dawn to dusk [laughs]. However, that is how it is.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, you have made predictions—we think your prognoses are valuable. What do you expect of 1994?

[Tudjman] You never need to predict things when you have your judgments and assessments, but I believe that in 1994 we will achieve the incorporation into Croatia of Croatian territory under Serbian occupation or under the protection of peacekeeping forces. I believe that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina will end and that in this way the Croatian state, the Croatian people, and all the citizens of Croatia will have the final preconditions for a peaceful life and normal development.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, finally, you are at the moment in the homes of all Croatian citizens. What would you like to tell them?

[Tudjman] Have confidence in yourselves—each Croatian person in himself or herself—and in your own people. And bring up your children to be decent people in the service of their own people, to the benefit of their families and their state, because the state is the home for the whole people, as an apartment or house is a home for the family. I believe that this people—the Croatian people—have something to be proud of. We have realized our freedom and democracy—people have fallen in battle for centuries to achieve this—and we should not miss this opportunity or bring into question in any way the very thing that we have realized. As a result, if I am in the homes of Croatian—not only Croatian people, but all citizens of Croatia—prove to me that we have been worthy of this freedom and of our state.

Kucan Reviews Arms Controversy, Politics

AU0401111994 Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 21 Dec 93 p 20-26

[Interview with President Milan Kucan by Miha Dj. Stamcar and Jani Sever; place and date not given: "Every Story Must End Sometime"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

Arms

[MLADINA] Following Slovenia's independence a war broke out in Croatia and Bosnia, and Slovenia helped these two countries with arms, too. Decisions were allegedly made at the sessions of the Defense Council. What did you discuss at these sessions?

[Kucan] In the presidency and at the Defense Council sessions we actually debated arms within three groups. First, the seizure and purchase of arms for Slovene requirements. At that time Slovenia had to prepare itself even for the most extreme possible outcome. However, the presidency had nothing to do with the purchase of arms. This was the responsibility of the government.

Second, we discussed arms when Croatia was attacked. Even before the war in Slovenia, [Defense and Interior] Ministers Jansa and Bavcar at the meeting with their Croatian counterparts wanted to sign a military alliance pact with the Croats. This would have involved us deeper into the Croatian war and Dr. Plut and Dr. Kmecl [presidency members] were both opposed to this. When the war in Croatia started, the defense minister's position was adopted that to assist Croatia was the best defense of Slovenia. We all agreed with it. We also agreed with the stance that Croatia should be helped with equipment and arms held by Slovenia to the extent to which this aid would not endanger Slovenia's defense capability.

When the war spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, we decided to help Bosnia-Herzegovina with the same arguments and on the basis of similar standpoints. Therefore, assistance yes, but on the condition that the defense capability of Slovenia is not endangered. Bearing in mind that at that time the situation in Bosnia, which was not ready for the war, grew very strained, the agreement to facilitate transport to Bosnia via Slovenia was understandable.

The last time we discussed this was this January, when prior to the formation of the new government Igor Bavcar, interior minister at that time, briefly assessed the circumstances. He said there were certain indications that an illegal arms trade was going on via Slovenia that could not be controlled. A debate then ensued whether to continue helping Bosnia as a state, although it had practically disintegrated into three parts, fighting among themselves. We adopted a position that all forms of assistance with the exception of humanitarian aid be stopped.

[MLADINA] From a distance it appears that matters became complicated over the minutes of the Defense Council sessions, which your office would not forward to the Defense Ministry, and as a result of which for over six months the ministry would not answer questions concerning arms from 27 deputies. The Defense Ministry claims that on the basis of these minutes a line could be drawn between state arms trade and illegal arms trade, in which state officials were involved, and which the Airport affair was all about. Why do you not simply send these minutes to the Defense Ministry?

[Kucan] Of course, a little more honesty on the part of the ministry would help the whole matter. All minutes and all materials are stored and accessible to the authorized persons of the Defense Ministry. A claim that the documents are not available to the Defense Ministry and that the latter, therefore, cannot prepare an answer for the State Chamber, does not correspond to the truth.

[MLADINA] The difference is perhaps between being able to see documents and studying them for some time.

[Kucan] I do not know why reading minutes in the Defense Ministry would be any different from reading them in Erjavceva [location of president's office]. The minutes are simply minutes. Each institution has a duty to protect its archives. There is no obstacle to prevent the documents being available to the people from the ministry for as long as they need them. When, for example, the criminal service of the Interior Ministry requested to see documentation in connection with the investigation of the Maribor airport arms affair, this was always available and the ministry's representatives never demanded to take it away. However, when the investigating judge requested these documents according to official procedure, the office acted the way it was obliged to according to the criminal procedure law. All this is, therefore, sheer manipulation with the public. The documents are available to the ministry. However, another question is whether the ministry really wants to study these documents in connection with the report for the State Chamber. I also consulted the members of the presidency about taking documents out of the office's archive, especially in light of the increasingly widespread practice of misusing highly classified documents, whose first victim was presidency member Ciril Zlobec. Namely, all these minutes date from the time of the presidency's mandate. All members agreed that the documents should stay in the house.

[MLADINA] Could one on the basis of these minutes really draw a line between the arms trade with and without the government's blessing?

[Kucan] One can conclude from these minutes that a political position was adopted that Croatia and Bosnia should be assisted with equipment as well as arms that Slovenia had at its disposal. One can also ascertain that a political decision that Slovenia would purchase arms for anyone else and then sell them was never made. One can determine who were the people in the Defense

Ministry that the Bosnia-Herzegovina representatives should turn to regarding this.

[MLADINA] Also the representatives of Croatia?

[Kucan] For Croatia this was not envisaged as there were no such problems. Because of the circumstances that emerged in Bosnia, many people presenting themselves as plenipotentiaries of the government or of various ministries were appearing in Slovenia. This caused uncertainty in the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry. Both ministries wanted the matters concerning Bosnia to be clarified.

Meeting with Izetbegovic

[MLADINA] The meeting of the Bosnian and the Slovene delegations in Brdo in the summer of 1992 was also connected to the aid to Bosnia. On that occasion you met with Izetbegovic. What did you discuss?

[Kucan] This was happening when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was in its initial, extreme phase. Just as we were looking for support abroad—moral and other—during the war in Slovenia, the Bosnians were also seeking help. In this way separate meetings of the government delegations and a meeting with President Izetbegovic took place in Brdo. The minutes of it exist. Beside myself, Mr. Ivan Oman, Assembly Vice President Vane Gosnik, Mr. Peter Tos from the Interior Ministry, my foreign affairs' adviser Ida Mocivnik, and Marjan Siftar, the chief of my cabinet at that time, also attended the talks that were requested by Izetbegovic. We primarily spoke about the general situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and whether Slovenia could put in a good word for Bosnia-Herzegovina at the diplomatic level and secure aid to this country.

[MLADINA] Did you use the term arms?

[Kucan] Of course. Izetbegovic primarily spoke about this, saying, if I remember correctly, that the greatest problem was shortage of ammunition. We have repeated our political stance that we would assist as much as we could but that we could not trade in arms for them, which he did not want anyway. We have facilitated the shipments for Bosnia to travel through our country, but we told Izetbegovic separately we hoped that he would not misuse humanitarian cargoes for the shipment of arms, because by this he would compromise us, himself, humanitarian aid, and humanitarian organizations.

[MLADINA] How did you agree as to who will take care of that?

[Kucan] Concrete decisions were the task of the government, that is to say, the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry. Minister Jansa appointed Mr. Lovsin as a contact person. How the things went from there on I do not know. The presidency has never received a report about this.

Meeting With Cengic

[MLADINA] It is normal for presidents of two countries to meet and discuss matters, but your meeting with Hasan Cengic is much more obscure.

[Kucan] As I have already said, it was not only Hasan Cengic who turned to me, but numerous other people who claimed that they were Bosnia-Herzegovina plenipotentiaries, bringing messages from President Izetbegovic about the situation in Bosnia and about whether we could intensify international diplomatic activity to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among others, Fikret Abdic, who was at that time a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, also came to visit me in this role. Because there were several of these people, we demanded, as I have already said, that they appoint an authorized representative to Slovenia, and Izetbegovic's answer to that was that Hasan Cengic was the man.

[MLADINA] Some believe that a man becomes a plenipotentiary only when a country in which he is supposed to work has acknowledged his credentials. Has Slovenia acknowledged the status of plenipotentiary to any of the Bosnian representatives who came here?

[Kucan] I informed the incumbent ministers that the Bosnians proposed Hasan Cengic as the plenipotentiary. Whether he had formal authority and whether he presented this to those in the Defense and Interior Ministries with whom he discussed concrete aid, I do not know. I myself did not demand this from him. I have held talks with him twice. I told him to turn to Mr. Lovsin, whom the [defense] minister had appointed as a contact person. However, concerning the arms' affair in Maribor, we have now received documents from Bosnia in which prime minister, the defense ministry, and the president say that the Slovene authorities knew that Cengic was the Bosnia-Herzegovina plenipotentiary. To my knowledge, there are three documents that officially confirm the identity of Hasan Cengic.

[MLADINA] You have said that three various Slovene state organs have received documents confirming that Hasan Cengic was Bosnia-Herzegovina plenipotentiary, however, the defense minister maintains that Cengic was not authorized. Did the minister see these three documents?

[Kucan] One was definitely addressed to the Defense Ministry via the Interior Ministry. I myself received it from there.

Also, if they cooperated with Cengic earlier, that is to say, before the discovery of the arms, without asking him for his authority, this means that they actually treated him as a plenipotentiary. A document addressed to the Defense Minister, referring to the meeting in September 1992, provides sufficient illustration. Everything now is just a sheer pretense.

[MLADINA] You spoke of the meeting with Izetbegovic at which you also discussed the arms assistance. There is

a UN arms embargo, however. You did not think that this could have had consequences for Slovenia.

[Kucan] I remember how it was when we were attacked and how frantically we needed and sought help. Also, how grateful I was and will be to [former German Foreign] Minister Genscher for the meeting in Villach and his immediate action, with which he mobilized his colleagues in the European Community to intercede to end the attack on Slovenia. This was my stance when the question arose as to whether we would help Croatia and later Bosnia. The embargo that was passed for the territory of the whole of Yugoslavia was particularly unfair toward the Muslims, because the Serbs nevertheless had contact with their hinterland—Serbia, they were getting arms from there, the Croats similarly, although with greater difficulty, from Croatia, while the Muslims could not get arms from anybody. I have spoken with numerous people in the world and most of them openly agreed that the arms embargo was unfair. Although I do not advocate war, I know what it means to be attacked in a war and not have arms. If I had to decide on it again, I would make the same decision to assist. Much more than this aid, the world holds against us the fact that we are now so passive toward the war in Bosnia, as if this does not concern us even though the war is raging so close.

[MLADINA] You, therefore, think that Slovenia is not active enough in its attempts to resolve the crisis?

[Kucan] I do not think that we are the ones who can offer a solution, however, I am not one of those who say that the slightest involvement in this issue would drag us back into the Balkans, of which we neither are nor wish to be a part. We definitely have as many reasons for cooperation in finding a solution for the Bosnian crisis as other European countries that are further away from the crisis, and also the same share of responsibility.

Supervised President

[MLADINA] Before the Airport affair, you met with Miro Predanic, agent of the Security Information Service, and later with Vinko Beznik, chief of the Slovene special police troops. How did you come meet with them and how did the Defense Ministry find out about it?

[Kucan] In the interview for your weekly, Miro Predanic has explained already the content of our talks. He had second thoughts, though, about talking to me in my office. Because he was high in the hierarchy of the Security Information Service, he probably knew why. For me this was a sufficiently clear warning.

I met with Mr. Beznik at my request. We discussed the confusion surrounding his decoration. At the proposal of Minister Bavcar, and with the agreement of his successor, Minister Bizjak, Mr. Vinko Beznik was awarded with a decoration. However, he was not supposed to receive it for the same reasons for which Mr. Tone Krkovic [head of special brigade Moris] had returned his decoration [sentence as published]. He explained that this was not the case. Subsequently, I read in the paper that Mr. Beznik was with me and how much time he spent with me. It is, of course, no secret who visits the president. However, it is interesting to note that somebody is supervising and even keeping a log of how many minutes the talks and visits last. I cannot imagine who would have the authority to do this.

[MLADINA] If this means supervision, it is obviously analytically supported. Do you suspect any secret service?

[Kucan] I do not know whether secret services are involved, however, they definitely do not have the authorization for such a thing. For this reason, in light of the notorious letter by the Civilian Initiative, I have demanded from the incumbent organs that they ascertain whether the statements contained in this anonymous letter are correct. Also, whether an organized group of people exists in the Slovenia that is gathering information about the functioning of the state organs, individual offices, and individual citizens without authorization. I am firmly convinced that a document like the two anonymous letters [both by the Civilian Initiative] cannot be written by one man alone, who would lack a database that can be compiled only in an organized fashion. Who in the country is in charge of this is known, although I believe that too many institutions in Slovenia are responsible for keeping records of personal data, and I am not referring merely to the intelligence and security services.

Presidential Visits

[MLADINA] Some politicians, not so much Jansa's circle but more Peterle's circle, sport the theory that Slovenia, with a president who is a member of the former [Communist] party, finds it much more difficult to find partners abroad than it would have had with somebody without such a past.

[Kucan] I would say that with imprudent partners Slovenia will find it difficult to assert itself in the world of intelligent partners. Today's world is no longer a world of ideologies, but a world of knowledge, arguments, pragmatism, and democracy. Contrary to some domestic politicians, the world recognizes the outcome of the democratic elections. I would also like to say, not without a reason, that I even get too many invitations. The problem is that we have no planned priorities as to how we should carry out these visits and what Slovenia can expect from them.

[MLADINA] What sort of priority are you referring to?

[Kucan] Priority in the spheres of interest of Slovenia's foreign policy. I agree with a commentary that I have read that my visit to Albania was a lost opportunity. I have asked the government for an opinion on the usefulness of this visit and about who should accompany me. After this visit I see the Slovene possibilities primarily in economic cooperation with Albania. Albania expects this, too. At the beginning of next year we plan to

hold a meeting of a mixed Slovene-Albanian economic commission, which will review the implementation of the interstate economic cooperation agreement. There are, of course, other decisions, too, for example, how great is our interest in cooperation with Turkey, Israel, Russia, and so forth.

[MLADINA] For the time being we have opted for the Czech Republic and ultimately we are supposed to form a customs union with it?

[Kucan] I believe that this is very important for Slovenia. I have also received an invitation from the Czech Republic to attend the spring meeting of all presidents of the Central European states—Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Slovenia.

[MLADINA] Whom will you take with you?

[Kucan] As usual, I will consult the government about this.

[MLADINA] The British Prime Minister Major invited successful English managers with him on his trip to India, where they were met by local people of similar standing.

[Kucan] When I travel where I was invited I will certainly try to open doors for Slovene companies or support them in their business pursuits. When Czech Prime Minister Mr. Klaus was visiting, I introduced him at the dinner to the directors of the Slovene companies that trade most with the Czech Republic and gave him the opportunity to have talks with them.

"Wild" Privatization

[MLADINA] Privatization has started in Slovenia and numerous directors are accused of being red directors, that is to say, Udbomafia people [connected to the former State Security Service]. What are your ideas about the property reform?

[Kucan] To become the owner of social property in a company is primarily the right of those who have managed it carefully for decades, enlarged it, and sacrificed higher salaries for the sake of investments, technological development, the conquest of markets, the raising of ecological awareness, and training. Regardless of the fact that social justice must be taken into account, we must primarily strive to establish a situation that will allow as much economic effectiveness as possible in the implementation of the law. This is the basic goal of property transformation.

However, if irregularities and abuses occur in this process, that is to say, during the implementation of this law, then such wrongdoings must first be proven and perpetrators subsequently punished. It is the juridical organs and the prosecutor that are responsible for this. Indiscriminate screaming about theft contributes neither toward the effectiveness of the property transformation process, nor to supervision and prevention of anomalies, and above all, not toward legal security, which is necessary for effective management. I would rather say that such behavior helps to create unstable circumstances that would suit the restructuring of the legitimate political power in Slovenia and the creation of a front behind which lawlessness could continue. [passage omitted]

Kucan's People

[MLADINA] Do you have a lobby?

[Kucan] It has become very popular to speak about lobbies recently. Not a single modern country functions without what is in Slovenia now understood as a lobby, however, I do not myself have a lobby.

Disregarding this, in every society an informal system of acquaintances and connections exists that is based on mutual trust and life experience. Actually, the only question is whether the lobby system functions within the legal framework or whether these acquaintances are being misused for illegal activities. It would be good for Slovenia if we passed a law on lobbying.

[MLADINA] Good. You do not have a lobby. So who are "Kucan's people" then? At the end of the day, papers often also publish names, and your men, who appear in the affairs surrounding Safti, Smelt, and others, could simply be enumerated.

[Kucan] Following this logic numerous former and current directors would be in my lobby, had I had one. Throughout the years of my political activity I have met with and consulted many of them. For example, about how the political situation in Yugoslavia will develop and such matters that were important for their development and business decisions. Quite a few of those who, following this criteria, would be in my lobby are now in other lobbies where they get much more useful and authentic information about economic, financial, and also other issues, as well as concrete party support. This does not seem unusual to me. They cannot get this support from me. As regards the names that you have mentioned, I would like to say that I only know Mr. Cupin from Safti from my youth, when he was one of the leading activists in the Slovene Youth Initiative in Trieste. I have nothing to do with his business in Safti, regardless of the latest affair and even allegations that I am Safti's owner.

[MLADINA] Did you ever meet with Igor Bavcar in Vodnikova 133, the headquarters of Adit, whose owner was also Safti? Namely, Adit director Mr. Platovsek told the agents of the military intelligence service so.

[Kucan] No, I did not know where this house was at all and when I found out, I remembered that I passed it when I was still living in Sisenska Street, when I went to Mostec with the children. At that time there was a dunghill in front of that house; it was a farm. The dunghill is gone but it obviously still stinks there.

[MLADINA] What about all these statements of Platovsek?

[Kucan] I do not know what Mr. Platovsek said to the agents of the VOMO [Military intelligence service]. What I have read of what he said about me and Safti has no real basis of truth whatsoever. I did not meet anyone and I did not forward information to anyone. However, in connection with this I am concerned that Mr. Platovsek said nothing about this to the investigating judge, the criminal police, or the prosecutor, as I deduce from the newspaper articles, but precisely to the military intelligence service. This service is not responsible for the disclosure of such actions as Mr. Platovsek speaks of. If I am to believe the newspapers, once this service had established what criminal activities Mr. Platovsek suspected Safti of, they did not immediately call the police.

[MLADINA] Do you believe that this service is not properly supervised?

[Kucan] In general I believe that the security-intelligence and counterintelligence services need to be supervised and directed by an authorized organ, in which the state's security concept or the state's protection policy, as determined by the parliament, should be embodied. This organ would at the same time direct the work of these services and supervise them. It cannot be left to the discretion of these services whether they will inform anyone about important security and intelligence information and whom they will inform if at all. Their duties must be clearly determined by the law or on the basis of the law, otherwise temptation will arise sooner or later and they will be abused. It was only the presidency of the republic that proposed the formation of a national security council during the constitutional debate. [passage omitted]

Electoral Promises

[MLADINA] You were elected president a year ago. From what you promised the voters what did you in your opinion deliver?

[Kucan] I do not have great problems regarding this. My slogan was: The work is not finished yet. The process of political and economic reforms in Slovenia and the process of Slovenia's integration in a modern society of peoples and nations are not yet completed. The social policy and transition into a post-industrial society are the components of this. I believe that bearing in mind the circumstances, especially the social situation, unemployment, and the uncertain future for the young people, I would nowadays have an even stronger reason for choosing the slogan I chose then.

[MLADINA] It was not an electoral promise, but the coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Slovene Christian Democrats, and the United List was also one of your ideas. What do you think of this coalition now and would you again advocate such a coalition?

[Kucan] It is true that I favored such a coalition precisely because of the recognition that the work was not yet over and that we were entering a very demanding phase of the state's regulation and its integration in the international sphere. I was convinced that this would be much easier if the responsibility for this were assumed by the three largest political parties chosen at the elections and if they accepted this as their principal goal.

[MLADINA] Did you have privatization in mind and the fact that these three parties will also get the biggest piece of the privatization cake?

[Kucan] No, but that they would, within the context I speak of, assume responsibility for the formation of a concept and take care of the legality of the property transformation process. Therefore, that they would invest their efforts for Slovenia and not primarily for their party interests, which are otherwise perfectly legitimate. The coalition is functioning as it is, that is to say, differently from what I expected. And since you ask me whether I would favor such a coalition again, my answer to you is yes, on the basis of the initial positions I spoke of, and no, on the basis of current practice.

[MLADINA] And why not in practice?

[Kucan] You see yourself how the coalition functions.

[MLADINA] Did you hear that the cabinet looked completely different 15 minutes prior to its proclamation, that is to say, that a different defense minister was on the list?

[Kucan] They asked me for my opinion and I answered that I advise the present minister. Whether this was decisive or not, I do not know.

[MLADINA] Would you now change your mind and decide differently.

[Kucan] Yes.

[MLADINA] Will you run for president again?

[Kucan] No.

[MLADINA] Why not?

[Kucan] Every story must end sometime.

Macedonia

Crvenkovski Interviewed on Albanian Issues

LD3112143593 Rome RAI Uno Television Network in Italian 1230 GMT 31 Dec 93

[Interview with Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski by correspondent Giorgio Atteni; place and date not given; Crvenkovski speaks in Serbo-Croatian with correspondent's superimposed translation—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Atteni] In Macedonia, where a quarter of the population are ethnic Albanians, nationalist factions are raising their profiles. Macedonia is the only former Yugoslav republic to have gained its independence peacefully, and it is an example of the cohabitation of different ethnic groups, which is more unique than rare in these parts. The Albanians are even represented in the government, run by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, who is only 32 years old.

What is the present situation like on the borders with Serbia and your other neighbors? There is talk of illegal trafficking and of the embargo being violated.

[Crvenkovski] Extremist Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovo, and Tirana, dream of a greater Albania. This plan is embarrassing for the authorities in Tirana, with whom we have good relations. If Kosovo were to explode, the war would be more devastating than the present one. The Albanians in Macedonia would rush to support their brothers, and Serbia could take advantage of this to invade our country. At this point Bulgaria, which recognized us and with which we now have good relations, would come forward with its ancient territorial claims. Even Greece, in which there is a Macedonian region, would be involved.

Russian Diplomat Views Relations

AU3012193093 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 30 Dec 93 p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Petrovich Trushin, representative of the Russian Federation in Macedonia, by Moscow correspondent Mirce Adamcevski in Moscow; date not given: "Macedonian Policy—the Future in the Balkans"]

[Text] Moscow, December. [date as published] The Russian Federation has recently appointed Yuriy Petrovich Trushin as its permanent representative to the Republic of Macedonia. He is a professional diplomat, involved in the Balkans for 20 years. His dissertation was on the Balkans, and he has also written a number of scientific works related to this region. He has spent more than 10 years working in the diplomatic service in Bulgaria. This year, he has been engaged in the global problems of that part of Europe. He has been professionally and scientifically linked to the Balkans for more than 20 years.

[Adamcevski] Mr. Trushin, how do you view your appointment to the post of permanent representative of the Russian Federation in Macedonia?

[Trushin] This appointment to Macedonia is a great honor for me. The Macedonian people are few in number, but have a deep and old culture, and if we look at the history of the Balkans, it cannot be disassociated from Macedonia. Moreover, our two peoples are closely connected through close blood, religious, and historic links. As you know, Russia was christened (it accepted Christianity) and became a Christian country through the great merit of the Ohrid Exarchate. We know that Kiev Russia had strong relations with Ohrid. There are numerous other examples in history when the two countries and peoples had active cooperation. From that aspect, it is a great honor and duty for me to be appointed to Macedonia. I say great duty because, unfortunately, the history of the Macedonian people was carried on in such a way that many in Macedonia know a lot about Russia, but only a few in Russia know about Macedonia. That will be one of my basic goals, to get to know that country better and to bring the truth about that people to the brotherly Russian people.

[Adamcevski] You have now touched the next question. What other aims will be basic to your activities?

[Trushin] I have already mentioned them: The intensification of the traditional friendship and cooperation between our two peoples. The second goal is to get to know the history and culture of that people, to study the present situation, and to inform my leadership, my government, my people. One of the most important goals of my stay in Macedonia, as a representative of the Russian Federation, will be to make our people, our country, realize the guarantee of stability and independence of the Macedonian people. The policy conducted by Russia in Macedonia should contribute to stability and peace in that country. In brief, these will be the goals during my stay in Macedonia.

[Adamcevski] What is your opinion of the present situation in Macedonia within the framework of the Balkans?

[Trushin] I think that the policy led by President Kiro Gligorov, who enjoys great respect in our country, and this has been confirmed during the numerous discussions and meetings I have had with my leadership, is the best policy, because his policy is directed toward good neighboring relations with the neighboring countries. That is an example of how the future policy in the Balkans should be, despite the fact that this is the time when Macedonia is surrounded by furious passions, wars, and interethnic disputes. Thanks to its leadership, thanks to the fact that the Macedonians are a very peaceful people, of good intentions, it can be said that Macedonia has succeeded in being the only states of former Yugoslavia to have avoided those events. Here, I think that this policy of peace, good neighboring relations, and cooperation with the neighbors, in my

opinion, is the main orientation in the policy of Macedonia. On that plan, Macedonia will always have support from Russia, from our government, and leadership.

[Adamcevski] Can you tell us about your views on the future development of the situation in Macedonia?

[Trushin] It is ungrateful to forecast policy. However, the way it seems to me, the fact we are now witnessing a broad process of recognition of Macedonia by the European countries, by the world, proves a full recognition of the peaceful policy of Macedonia. My opinion is that the line of international recognition of Macedonia, neglecting the known difficulties, represents a chance for Macedonian perspectives, for overcoming those difficulties, for it becoming a full and equal member of the world's community on its road to civilized development.

[Adamcevski] What will be your role and the role of the Russian Federation in that direction?

[Trushin] If we reduce all that to Russian-Macedonian relations, I would like to mention that Russia was the first of the superpowers to recognize Macedonia. It recognized its independence on 4 August last year, by the act of our President Boris Yeltsin. Then our Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev paid a visit to Macedonia, followed by his deputy Vitaliy Churkin. In implementing the act of President Yeltsin, official inter-state relations were established between the two countries and respective representatives were appointed. My leadership has entrusted me with the task of going to the spot and learning about the situation in Macedonia, and then I am expected to submit adequate proposals to our leadership and government in compliance with the development of the situation.

[Adamcevski] What is your opinion of the presence of the UN forces in Macedonia?

[Trushin] Our line in that direction is clear and consistent. If those forces contribute to the development of stability and the reinforcement of peace in Macedonia, to its economic growth and security, we can then welcome such a presence.

[Adamcevski] However, some Russian media said that Russia had abandoned the Balkans, asking about the reason for the presence of the Americans there, that is in Macedonia.

[Trushin] First of all, we look at the presence of the Americans within the framework of the UN forces. On the other hand, I think that such an aspect appears as a remnant of the ideological concept of the division of the world between the two superpowers. Now, we are developing a Russian policy on the indispensable Partnership for Peace, for which we meet understanding in the Western world. Therefore, any actions, Russian, U.S., or some other countries', must contribute to the reinforcement of stability, of good neighborliness. The ideological remnants must be excluded from these actions, as well as the confrontations and the division of the world between two systems. That is why we consider that our role, I would say, in assisting Macedonia, will mean a continuation in the direction followed hitherto. If the U.S. policy leads to stability and development in Macedonia, we shall welcome it and we shall cooperate with the Americans.

[Adamcevski] You know that a great part of the Macedonian foreign trade exchange was linked to the USSR, that is Russia. What will you do, now that the exchange has been lowered, to promote this situation?

[Trushin] With the breaking up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, the traditional trade relations have been remarkably weakened. It does not affect only the former republics of the USSR and Yugoslavia, because it is a larger process. Let me note that Macedonia was the only one of the former Yugoslav republics that imported more than it exported to the USSR. This is a very significant detail. Our analyses show that there are possibilities for increasing Macedonian exports to Russia. Our side is pleased to show great interest in textiles and small industry. Our large market is interested in tobacco, in shoes, and in many other products bought in Macedonia. There is a mutual interest with the Macedonians, too. Now that the economy is being restructured, it is very important to start direct links and contacts between the respective companies. In that framework, I view my mission in Macedonia as a possibility for promoting economic cooperation to a higher level. It will be a great contribution if Russia helps Macedonia get back on its feet. That is extremely valuable. For that purpose it was decided, right after my appointment, to also appoint an economic counselor to Macedonia. It demonstrates that we have put the issue of foreign trade relations in the first place.

[Adamcevski] Would you like to add something I have failed to ask about?

[Trushin] I would like to say that the characteristic of my mission is that, compared to representatives and ambassadors appointed to, so to say, "worked out" countries, I am starting an unusual mission in that aspect. Unfortunately, that was due to history itself, therefore there are no experts on the Macedonian language, on the Macedonian history, and so on. Therefore, in addition to my everyday obligations, I shall be also learning the language, the country.... In that perspective, my contacts with Macedonian historians, linguists, and people of culture, will play a great role for me. On that plan, we must use the links among the scientists of the two countries, as well as the existing potentials. There are such ideas now. When it became clear I was going to Macedonia, I was visited by some representatives of the intelligentsia, the mass media, some scientists, and they came out with the idea of opening a Russian House in Macedonia, which would be the only one in the Balkans. Therefore, it would be a Russian House accumulating the spiritual wealth of the Russian people, which we would generously share with our brothers, the Macedonian people. This idea has already been accepted by

Macedonia. I have already had meetings with your eminent writers and artists. The government circles have also accepted it with pleasure and approval. It will be the first step in introducing the two peoples that have traditional and cultural links. There are also other ideas, but this is the first major one, and I, as the first representative of the Russian Federation, would like to realize it. I think it will also be well accepted by the neighboring countries. I think they will have an understanding for that, so that we can expand the cooperation.

And finally, I would like to wish the Macedonian brotherly people success in overcoming the present difficulties and in making Macedonia a flourishing state in the family of civilized nations.

[Box, p 2]

Promptness for Better Mutual Cooperation

Yesterday, President of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov received a protocol visit of the official representative of the Russian Federation in our country, Yuriy Petrovich Trushin.

The Russian representative conveyed to President Gligorov the cordial greetings and new year's wishes of President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and the Russian leadership, emphasizing their readiness to promote further relations and cooperation with Macedonia in the interest of the two nations and countries, for peace and stability in the region.

President Gligorov expressed his gratitude and returned the greetings and wishes, emphasizing that Macedonia is following with great attention and pleasure the efforts of President Yeltsin and the Russian leadership to further democracy in Russian society and peace in the world. Gligorov also talked about the possibilities for, and interest in, an ample cooperation in all fields of mutual interest, based on the historical links between the two countries and on the democratic developments in both countries.

President Gligorov welcomed the opening of the Office of the Russian Federation in Macedonia and expressed his hopes that it would soon grow into an embassy.

Discussions were also held on the current issues regarding Macedonian-Russian relations, on the situation in both the countries, as well as on the situation in the Balkans. This was stated by the Cabinet of the president of the Republic of Macedonia.

Vojvodina

Subotica's Ethnic Hungarian Mayor on SPS Charges

94CH0155A Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 16 Dec 93 p 6

[Unattributed report on news conference held on 15 December by Jozsef Kasza, mayor of Subotica: "To Weather the Misery"]

[Text] At a news conference held yesterday, Mayor Jozsef Kasza reacted to charges leveled by the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] Szabadka [Subotica] organization at Tuesday's news conference. As reported in detail by this newspaper, the grave charges related primarily to the social policy of the local government; the soup kitchen opened last Monday was viewed as humiliating from the standpoint of citizens, and as a political move whose timing coincides with the elections.

"Despite the difficult situation and the grave shortage of money, the local government is taking every possible action to provide for the poorest stratum of the city's residents, to enable these people to weather the cold and the misery. The fundamental void in the charges leveled by the gentlemen from the SPS is that they forget to mention the fact that they were the ones who brought this situation upon the citizens, the same people who are now in power in the republic, and whose policies cast the country into total isolation, and its citizens into total misery," Jozsef Kasza said relative to the charges that "exceed anything we have heard so far." "I agree with the assertion that a soup kitchen is degrading, particularly in this part of Vojvodina, one of the richest agricultural areas of Serbia, where extremely diligent people live, people who could earn a livelihood as a result of their work. But inappropriate policies have brought these people to a point where they cannot afford to buy a loaf of bread, or a single warm meal per day. The SPS does not support our humanitarian action program, despite the fact that they have been hauling food away from here to other parts of the country for years. We are aware of the identity of those who carried relief supply shipments to every part of the former Yugoslavia; they took aid collected in Szabadka to the battle fields, or the shipments ended up on the black market. At this point it is the local government's function to rescue citizens lingering below the subsistence level. By using funds from our tight budget, and from humanitarian aid received, we are trying to help these people irrespective of their nationality, religion, or political belonging. At this point, those who plundered the northern Bacska region have tried to undermine the launching of a soup kitchen program. They cannot succeed in this effort, however, because the people of Szabadka are prepared to cook on hot plates to save their fellow citizens from hunger," according to the Szabadka mayor. The mayor expressed regrets over the fact that the SPS, while increasingly losing ground, creates political issues out of social welfare concerns, and in the course of this, it uses the customary method of telling lies. Jozsef Kasza denied that the SPS members of the municipal committee in charge of organizing supplies for the populace were not invited to participate in the committee's work. Compliance with the most recent government decree is delayed because the ministry having jurisdiction has failed to dispatch all the the vouchers, despite repeated interventions. Citizens did not receive their laundry detergent for September because the local government had neither funds nor fuel to transport the detergent from Krusevac to Szabadka. Transportation charges for bringing the per

capita rations to Szabadka frequently exceeded the worth of goods to be transported.

Jozsef Kasza expressed regrets over the fact that a noted professional, Dr. Rodoljub Duric, the director of the Szabadka hospital, also joined the SPS's campaign, which is filled with lies and is aimed at discrediting the local government. Managing the hospital would be his primary function, but "he should, at least, be honest as long as he entered into political discourse," because the local government supports the hospital by using municipal reserve funds. The mayor of Szabadka says that it is not true that Dusan Stipanovic successfully lobbied for the opening of a border crossing point at Bajmok-Bacsalmas; the truth is that Stipanovic raised obstacles in the path of opening the crossing point. Similarly, the truth is that Jozsef Kasza negotiated with Foreign Minister Jovanovic and with the appropriate Hungarian organizations regarding extended work hours. Construction of facilities at the border crossing point is also impeded by people from Bajmok encouraged by the SPS; construction could begin upon release of the disputed area. On the other hand, contrary to to experience of residents of other municipalities, Szabadka residents are unable to obtain passports for months. This could not occur if Interior Ministry organs performed their functions and provided passports continuously. Every citizen has a right to receive passports.

"The Szabadka local government wants peace, and tries to conduct its affairs despite the difficult circumstances that it experiences by no fault of its own," Mayor Jozsef Kasza said in conclusion of yesterday's news conference.

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